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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: TOWARD A DEFINITION OF
“FOREIGN OFFICIAL”
INTRODUCTION

T

he Mexican government is the only entity permitted to
own and exploit Mexico’s natural resources, and as such,
it may create other entities tasked with the management and
distribution of those resources.1 The Mexican government has
used this mandate to create a petroleum company, Petróleos
Mexicanos (“PEMEX”), which it wholly owns.2 The Mexican
government appoints every member of the PEMEX governing
board and employs PEMEX’s other employees, as well.3
Exxon and Occidental are both American petroleum companies that compete for the ability to drill for oil in Mexican waters, and the Mexican government has authorized PEMEX to
grant those concessions.4 Consider the following hypothetical:5
Exxon submits a bid of $95 million6 for the drilling concession
and Occidental submits one worth $100 million. PEMEX has
made no indication of which company it plans to choose, but
arranges to select the winning bid and award the contract at a
public ceremony to which both companies are invited.7 During
the ceremony, but before PEMEX awards the contract, the
chief executive officer and chairman of Exxon gives the chief
executive officer of PEMEX a check for $10 million, at which
point PEMEX awards Exxon the drilling concession.8
Now, consider the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”).9 The FCPA prohibits paying bribes to foreign offi-

1. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119–20 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
2. Id. (noting that the PEMEX website indicates that it is “[a] government agency . . . created and . . . owned by the Mexican government.”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Central District of California posed this hypothetical in the course
of Aguilar. Id. at 1119–20.
6. All figures are in U.S. Dollars.
7. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1119–20.
8. Id. at 1119–20.
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [FCPA], 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3
(1998).
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cials to improperly attain business abroad.10 Under the FCPA,
a “foreign official” is “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such [entity].”11
Do Exxon’s actions fit within that framework? Should the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) prosecute one or both of the parties for violating the FCPA? Is the president of PEMEX even a
“foreign official”? The Central District of California in United
States v. Aguilar asked the defendants during a hearing on this
exact hypothetical,
whether any responsible Congressional leader would respond
to such a DOJ inquiry by saying, “No, do not prosecute Exxon
or its CEO, because PEMEX is a state-owned corporation and
it was not the intention of Congress to consider any corporation an ‘instrumentality’ of any foreign government, regardless of the other facts warranting prosecution.”12

The defendants answered the inquiry by suggesting that a
Congressional leader may indeed respond in just such a way,
provided he was uninfluenced by political considerations and
elections.13 Although the court posited that “whether injected
with truth serum or not, members of Congress would not deem
such a prosecution to be beyond the purview of the FCPA merely because PEMEX is a state-owned corporation,”14 the debate
has yet to be officially resolved in American jurisprudence. In
fact, the Aguilar court posed this hypothetical precisely because it found that the legislative history of the FCPA did not
point directly towards including or excluding employees of
state owned corporations within the definition of “foreign official.”15

10. Id.
11. FCPA, § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
12. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1119. As this Note went to print, the DOJ issued a guidance indicating that it does consider these employees within the purview of the
FCPA. Although the guidance is “non-binding, informal, and summary in
nature,” it will be a useful tool for the courts when faced with defining “foreign official.” See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A
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Despite the potential ambiguity in the statute, the DOJ has
been prosecuting a growing number of actions pursuant to the
FCPA, increasing from five in 2004 to seventy-four in 2010.16
The settlement figures are also on the rise, with half of the ten
biggest FCPA settlements, which in some cases topped $350
million, occurring in 2010.17 This continued increase may be
attributable in part to the Obama Administration, evidenced by
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2009 proclamation that,
because corruption is a “scourge on civil society” and “one of the
greatest struggles of our time,”18 it requires vigilant enforcement. Yet even before the current administration, the DOJ and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) began increasing enforcement following the set of amendments that expanded the FCPA’s scope in 1998.19 Additionally, the DOJ and
SEC began encouraging firms to disclose FCPA violations voluntarily, and the firms have been doing so with greater frequency, as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its disclosure
requirements.20
For many industries, doing business in corruption-prone areas may be something that simply comes with the territory, requiring a balancing between pursuing international business

RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT aii, 19–21
(2012).
16. Bribery Abroad: A Tale of Two Laws, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011)
http://www.economist.com/node/21529103.
17. Id. (“[R]ecent years have seen a spike in enforcement, from five actions
in 2004 to 74 in 2010. Five of the ten biggest settlements ever were last year,
including a $400 [million] fine against BAE systems, a British defense contractor, and a $365 [million] fine against ENI, an Italian oil firm.”).
18. Jon Jordan, Recent Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and the New UK Bribery Act: A Global Trend Towards Greater Accountability
in the Prevention of Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 845, 861 (2011).
19. Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the
FCPA in the United States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, 1665 PLI/CORP. 711, 715 (2008).
20. Id. at 742–43; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (2002). Enacted on July 30, 2002 in an effort to curb corporate
fraud, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “regulat[es] accounting practices, imposes disclosure requirements on directors and officers and the corporations themselves as well as increases the penalties for violations of federal securities
laws.” John F. Olson, Josiah O. Hatch, & Ty R. Sagalow, Possible Liabilities
of Officers and Directors under Federal and State Statutes, in DIR. & OFF.
LIAB § 3:139 (Nov. 2011).
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opportunities and avoiding running afoul of U.S. law. 21 For example, in the energy industry, “the work of navigating ancient
kingdoms and secretive relationships has become an integral
part of finding new [oil] reserves, . . . [and] has led the industry
. . . to the most difficult corners of the earth.”22 These energy
companies, and other types of businesses, have been targeted
in the upswing of DOJ and SEC prosecutions under the FCPA
that began in 2004.23 Likewise, Wal-Mart, which has been rapidly expanding across the globe, found itself in trouble in Mexico in early 2012, and Hollywood studios have had to answer
similar questions about their dealings in China and the accompanying FCPA implications.24
These businesses will also need to conform to the United
Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 (“U.K. Act”), which was passed in
2010 and went into effect in July 2011.25 This statute is even
broader in scope and more restrictive than the FCPA, even if
some consider it “better crafted,” because it is also fairer to
firms.26 The U.K. Act provides a compliance defense, which protects honest firms from suffering the most severe of consequences if a briber was “one rogue employee,” and the firm had
a clear and effective anti-bribery program.27 Regardless of the
U.K. Act’s specific content, there can be no doubt that it presents additional anti-corruption hurdles that global businesses
must meet if they want to avoid the courtroom.28
As can be expected, the enthusiasm of the DOJ and SEC for
the FCPA is not shared universally.29 Some have suggested
21. Nathan Vanderklippe, Jumping through hoops to win business in Libya: Canadian corporations face a thicket of ethical questions, hazy laws back
home and local government greed, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 22, 2011, at A20.
22. Id.
23. Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
749, 751 (Spring 2011); see also Vanderklippe, supra note 21.
24. See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart
After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at A1; Edward Wyatt,
Michael Cieply, and Brookes Barnes, S.E.C. Asks if Hollywood Paid Bribes in
China, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2012, at B1.
25. Bribery Abroad, supra note 16; Chris Borg, Emma Radmore, and Madeleine de Remusat, Bribery Act 2010: No More Excuses, COMPLIANCE
MONITOR, May 2011, at 1.
26. Bribery Abroad, supra note 16.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Shawn McCarthy, Resource curse puts companies in crosshairs: U.S.listed Canadian firms will be included in SEC international anti-corruption
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that this vigorous enforcement of the FCPA essentially serves
as a “de facto sanction” against these corruption-prone countries,30 while many players in big business see the FCPA as injurious to the United States’ competitive advantage and as a
major hindrance to business profitability.31 Essentially, they
believe the FCPA “holds [American companies] to a higher
standard” than their foreign competitors, which are permitted
to conduct their business in a way that would technically violate the FCPA.32 The statute’s additional restraints on American companies thus negatively affect their ability to compete in
those markets.33 The high chance of violating the FCPA and
facing prosecution discourages about a third of British and a
quarter of American companies from doing business in countries that are prone to corruption.34 Due to concerns about “onerous compliance costs and competitive disadvantage,” some
companies would “prefer the rule-making be harmonized
among major trading partners to reduce the potential for problems.”35 Although such harmonization would require significant
work from the outset, an essential starting point, which would
greatly improve companies’ ability to plan their business
abroad, would be solidifying a definition of “foreign official.”36
The particular question of how to define a “foreign official”
under the FCPA is at issue for any type of corporation looking

rules, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 22, 2011, at B3 (“The oil industry, in particular, is
raising alarms.”).
30. Id.
31. See generally David S. Hilzenrath, Can You Spot the Bribe? American
Businesses Cannot Either, WASH. POST, July 24, 2011, at G01 [hereinafter
Hilzenrath, Spot?]; McCarthy, supra note 29; David S. Hilzenrath, The Price
of Global Business (in a Briefcase Full of Cash), WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2011,
at A14 [hereinafter Hilzenrath, Price].
32. Hilzenrath, Price, supra note 31 (quoting regulatory filing of Diebald,
an Ohio-based producer of automatic teller machines).
33. Id. (quoting regulatory filing of Diebald, an Ohio-based producer of
automatic teller machines).
34. Bribery Abroad, supra note 16.
35. McCarthy, supra note 29.
36. See Bribery Abroad, supra note 16; Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Trade Associations Request Better Guidance on FCPA Implementation, 28 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 182, 182 (2012); Tom Hamburger, Brady Dennis & Jia
Lynn Yang, Wal-Mart Took Part in Lobbying Campaign to Amend AntiBribery Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2012, at A01.
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to do business abroad.37 Energy companies are an illustrative
example of the “foreign official” ambiguity problem because
many energy companies are nationalized, wholly or partially,
so their agents may arguably be considered public officials. Any
U.S. companies looking to operate in compliance with the law,
then, need to be able to identify which energy sector agents
may trigger FCPA liability, though all too often this proves to
be a difficult task.38 Recent cases in the United States address
the definition of “foreign official,” however, the courts have yet
to provide a clear one.39
When a statute’s text is ambiguous, courts may “turn to the
legislative history to ascertain Congress’s intent.”40 Additionally, if the legislative history is inconclusive, the court may apply
the rule of lenity and construe the statute in favor of the defendant (in the case of “foreign official,” narrowly).41 However,
“[t]he rule of lenity applies only where . . . resort[ing] to any
and all other sources still results in a tie as to the proper interpretation.”42 Therefore, reviewing the stated motivations for
enacting anti-corruption legislation in the United States, the
U.K., and relevant international organizations, and subsequent

37. Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1245–46 (2008).
38. See id. at 1268–69. Although some nations are trending towards privatizing nationally-owned companies rather than nationalizing private companies, that transition is often caught in a state of limbo, leaving those companies still partially state-owned. To provide one example, Iran privatized all
of its major industries but specifically excluded its oil and gas industry from
that process. Id.
39. In Carson Case, DOJ Agrees ‘Foreign Official’ Knowledge is Required,
FCPA
BLOG
(Sept.
27,
2011,
1:28
AM),
THE
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/9/27/in-carson-case-doj-agrees-foreignofficial-knowledge-is-requ.html; see United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d
1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc., No. 8–
299, 2012 WL 2094029 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012); United States v. Carson et
al., No. SA CR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *2–5 (C.D. Cal. May 18,
2011) (employees of state-owned companies may fall within the FCPA’s
meaning of “foreign official;” instrumentalities of foreign governments may
include entities that are not departments or agencies of a foreign government
and a categorical exclusion of state-owned companies may be improper).
40. United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Xia Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 n.13 (2000)).
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American judicial interpretation of “foreign official,”43 can provide guidance in the creation of an as-yet unsolidified definition
of the term “foreign official” within the FCPA.44
Part I of this Note will propose three analytical lenses
through which one may examine anti-corruption legislation.
Part II will use those lenses to survey comparative anti-bribery
measures developed by the Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“Convention”) and also the United Kingdom. Part III will then focus those lenses on the FCPA itself,
exploring its history and judicial interpretation. Part IV will
examine the specific matter of “foreign official” in light of the
general discussion of anti-corruption legislation and consider a
definition using the three analytical lenses offered at the beginning of this Note.
I. THREE ANALYTICAL LENSES FOR DEFINING “FOREIGN
OFFICIAL”
The following three analytical models may provide direction
as to the intended meaning of “foreign official”: the Charming
Betsy Doctrine;45 the level playing field argument;46 and the
public trust doctrine, which includes both the traditional and
corporate proconsul variations.47 Each proposed model will be
described in turn.
A. The Charming Betsy Doctrine: Complying with International
Norms
In 1804, the court in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy
held that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”48 That concept has become known as the Charming
Betsy Doctrine.49 The Charming Betsy Doctrine has had a lasting impact on legislation, and compliance with international
43. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
44. See id.
45. See infra Part I.A.
46. See infra Part I.B.
47. See infra Part I.C.
48. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117–18, 2
L.ED. 208 (1804).
49. See, e.g., Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1116.
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norms was an important factor behind the implementation of
the FCPA.50 The need and desire to align with the views of the
international community influenced the anti-corruption legislation in the United Kingdom, as well.51 Thus, examining international definitions of “foreign official,” and the motivations
behind the specific wording of said definitions in light of the
Charming Betsy Doctrine, could help clarify the definition within the American legislation.
B. The Level Playing Field Approach: Promoting Fair Competition
Considering the motivating effect that compliance with international norms had on drafting the American and British
anti-corruption legislation, reviewing the goals of the OECD
Convention could help direct our understanding of the FCPA
and the U.K. Act and, specifically, their respective uses of the
term “foreign official.”52 The OECD is an independent organization that serves to “promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.”53 The
ideas motivating the OECD in general, and the OECD Convention, provide another analytical lens: the level playing field.
One major goal of the OECD Convention was to “level [the]
playing field,”54 or, in other words, to promote fair competition.55 This popular concept deals with the competitiveness of
markets that have been compromised by corruption.56 Applying
the level playing field concept to the U.K. and U.S. legislation,
and to their respective definitions of “foreign official,” could
therefore provide another route to clarification.

50. Nicholas Cropp, The Bribery Act vs. the FCPA: Nuance vs. Nous, [2011]
CRIM. L.R. 122, 125–126 (2011).
51. See id. at 126.
52. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 1259–60. For a more extensive discussion
of the OECD and its goals, see infra Part II.A.
53. About the OECD, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [OECD],
http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
54. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125.
55. Id. at 123.
56. Id. at 124–25.
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C. The Public Trust Doctrines
1. Public Trust: The Traditional View
Some international organizations view corruption in terms of
the public trust doctrine. In their view, the public grants certain individuals positions of power, and when those individuals
corruptly exploit those positions, it is a breach of public trust.57
For example, the OECD Convention defines corruption as the
“abuse of public or private office for personal gain.”58 Similarly,
Transparency International is an international coalition
against corruption that “work[s] cooperatively with all individuals and groups, with for-profit and not-for-profit corporations
and organisations, and with governments and international
bodies committed to the fight against corruption.”59 It defines
corruption as “behaviour on the part of officials in the public
sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which [those officials] improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those
close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to
them.”60
2. Public Trust: The Corporate Proconsul View61
The “corporate responsibility” or corporate proconsul model is
a variant of the public trust model and can elucidate the definition of “foreign official,” as well.62 This model has a similar concept to the traditional public trust model—that a duty is owed
to the public at large stemming from the entity’s place of power
57. OECD, CORRUPTION: A GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 2
(2007) [hereinafter OECD, GLOSSARY].
58. Id. at 19.
59. Who
We
Are,
TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_val
ues (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
60. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 20.
61. In The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, George Greanias and Duane
Windsor contemplate corporations as being the holders of public trust. They
discuss the idea of “the corporation as government proconsul.” This concept
accounts for what the authors perceived as a “major change in government
intervention in the private sector . . . from government action to achieve economic ends to government action intended to reach various social goals.”
GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 46 (1982).
62. See id. at 44 (explaining the possible quasi-political role of corporations).
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and trust within society63—only here the entity in that place of
power and trust is a corporation rather than a public official.64
The corporation, “by virtue of the financial, human, and natural resources that it commands, by the great wealth which it
accumulates and expends, and by its ability to affect even those
not directly affiliated with the enterprise, has power that is not
merely economic but also social and political,”65 and therefore is
afforded public trust. Importantly, this corporate accountability
concept is distinct from that of legal corporate responsibility.66
Corporate accountability,
is rooted in the concept that corporations have been granted a
franchise or license by society that is in the nature of a privilege. Continuation of that franchise requires an accounting of
the corporation’s relationship with and contribution to society. The franchise comes with terms and conditions; thus the
corporate community must hold itself accountable to society
beyond legal compliance with statutes and regulations. Accountability extends to corporate power, corporate performance, and corrupt behavior. Legal compliance and ethical
behavior are expected.67

Because the public places its trust in the corporation, corporate
corruption and bribery violates that trust.68 Though neither
iteration of the public trust doctrine defines “foreign official”
per se, both may still provide valuable insight into the way
many international actors approach the term.
II. COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION
Studying foreign anti-corruption legislation, in addition to
policy proposals from international organizations, is a constructive exercise when analyzing vague domestic legislation
such as definitional language within the FCPA. Doing so in
this case is not only important for application of the Charming
Betsy Doctrine, but it also helps to generally survey the anticorruption landscape. The OECD Convention and the U. K. Act

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 44, 46.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 44.
See id. at 35–36.
Id.
Id. at 45–46.

2012] TOWARD A DEFINITION OF "FOREIGN OFF'L"

425

provide useful comparative legislation for the FCPA and also
working definitions of the term “foreign official.”
A. OECD Convention
The mission of the OECD is to promote equal economic footing for all countries through fair, multilateral trade and competition.69 The OECD Convention was adopted in November 1997,
entered into force in February 1999, and as of April 2012, thirty-four OECD member countries and five non-member countries had signed onto it.70 The Convention “establishes legally
binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and provides for a
host of related measures that make this effective.”71
Generally, the OECD subscribes to the level playing field or
fair competition model of validating anti-corruption legislation:
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on
14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th September 1961, the [OECD] shall promote policies designed:
to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth
and employment and a rising standard of living in
Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the
world economy;
to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member
as well as non-member countries in the process of
economic development; and
to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance
with international obligations.72

However, the OECD has also faced outside pressure to adopt
the fair competition approach. “[The] diplomatic pressure exerted by the United States on other nations to level the playing
field internationally, was arguably a key factor in the creation
of the 1997 OECD Convention, which in turn resulted in
69. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 2.
70. Id. at 19; Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/
briberyininternationalbusiness (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
71. OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
72. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 2.
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FCPA-like legislation in numerous signatory nations,” including the United Kingdom.73 Moreover, the fact that the OECD
strives to “accord[] with international obligations” suggests
that the same motivations behind the Charming Betsy Doctrine
were also at play during the drafting of the OECD convention.74
B. The U.K. Act
The U.K. Act75 criminalizes the bribery of government officials, both domestic and foreign; commercial bribery; the acceptance of bribes; and the failure of a corporation to prevent
the offering of bribes.76 Furthermore, the statutory language
encompasses several types of entities,77 including firms incorporated in the United Kingdom, those that have a business—or
any part of a business—within the United Kingdom, and any
person that is “associated” with such corporations.78 The statute defines an “associated” person as anyone that acts on behalf of the corporation.79
Although the U.K. Act is progressive in many respects, including its provision imposing strict liability on firms failing to
prevent bribery, it also affords corporations some defenses.80 To
offer one important example, a corporation under investigation
may escape liability by providing proof that it composed, diligently implemented, and informed employees and associates of
adequate anti-bribery compliance rules.81
1. The U.K. Act and Charming Betsy
The Charming Betsy Doctrine, though a feature of U.S. law,
represents an approach to enacting and interpreting a nation’s
domestic legislation that played a crucial role in creating the
U.K. Act. The OECD Convention put forth standards for anticorruption legislation and made recommendations for the Unit73. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125.
74. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 2.
75. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (2010) (Eng.) [hereinafter U.K. Act]. The U.K.
Act was passed on March 30, 2011 and entered into force on July 1, 2011.
Borg, supra note 25, at 1; Jordan, supra note 18, at 864.
76. U.K. Act, c. 23.
77. Id.
78. Jordan, supra note 18, at 865–66.
79. Id.
80. U.K. Act, c. 23.
81. Jordan, supra note 18, at 866.
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ed Kingdom to bring itself into immediate compliance with
those standards in 2003, 2005, and 2007.82 In October 2008, the
OECD indicated, in its report on a British bribery case,83 that it
was “disappointed and seriously concerned with the unsatisfactory implementation of the Convention by the UK.”84 Such criticism by the OECD, in which other international organizations
and even other countries joined, likely influenced the U.K.’s
decision to reform its anti-bribery legislation,85 though the explanatory notes to the U.K. Act suggest that it was written in
response to the country’s self-realization that existing anticorruption laws were outdated, convoluted, and “in need of reform.”86
82. OECD, United Kingdom: Phase 2bis: Report on the Application of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery
in International Business Transactions, at 5 (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter
OECD, Phase 2bis]; OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Report on the United Kingdom 2007, at 89 (July 17, 2006) [hereinafter
OECD, Implementing]; see also Tim Pope & Thomas Webb, The Bribery Act
2010, 25(10) J. INT’L. BANKING L. & REG. 480, 480 (2010).
83. In 2004, the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) began an
investigation into alleged bribery by BAE Systems PLC, a British exporter of
military aircraft, in relation to a contract with Saudi Arabia for Al-Yamamah
aircraft. See The Queen on the Application of Corner House Research and
others v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] UKHL 60, (appeal taken
from [2008] EWHC (Admin) 246). The SFO halted the investigation in 2006
prompting the criticism by the OECD. See id. In 2008, the Divisional Court
found that the SFO’s discontinuation of the investigation into BAE Systems
was unlawful. See id. The House of Lords overturned that decision on appeal,
deciding that the Director of the SFO acted properly in taking into account
threats made against the British public if the investigation continued, regardless of whether it was in violation of Article 5 of the OECD Convention.
See id.
84. OECD, Phase 2bis, supra note 82, at 4; Pope, supra note 82, at 481.
85. Id. at 123 (“In reality, external pressures and concerted international
criticisms of the UK’s existing approach to corruption may have had greater
impact on the genesis of the Act than is suggested.”).
86. Cropp, supra note 50, at 122.
Explanatory Notes suggest that reform was needed because “the law
in the United Kingdom was ‘old and anachronistic’ and that ‘[f]rom a
purely legal perspective, the case for reform is a compelling one.’”
[quoting Jack Straw MP] This language suggests that the 2010 Act
originated with an internal realization that the U.K.’s antiquated
bribery laws were in need of reform. The explanatory notes quote the
Law Commission’s November 2008 Report, “Reforming Bribery,” in
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In addition to the OECD’s influence, the United States also
may have impacted the United Kingdom’s decision to revise its
anti-corruption legislation.87 The U.S. National Security Strategy identifies the fight against corruption as an integral part of
its mission to protect human rights and to stimulate development and security around the world.88 Transparency and accountability with regard to the finances of governments and
their public officials are important parts of such anticorruption effort.89 The United States, in seeking to expand its
security policies and to maintain competitive advantages for
citizens engaging in foreign business, has exerted pressure on
the United Kingdom to bring its own anti-corruption legislation
up to international norms.90
The language in provisions of the U.K. Act itself is also indicative of the United Kingdom’s reaction to international pressure to reform its anti-corruption legislation.91 For example,
which the Commission similarly notes that “the current law is riddled with uncertainty and in need of rationalization.”
Id.
87. Id. at 125.
Indeed the disadvantage occasioned to US corporations by the compliance requirements of the FCPA, and subsequent diplomatic pressure exerted by the United States on other nations to level the playing field internationally, was arguably a key factor in the creation of
the 1997 OECD Convention, which in turn resulted in FCPA-like
legislation in numerous signatory nations.
Id. The United States influenced the creation of the OECD Convention, which
in turn influenced the United Kingdom to bring its anti-corruption legislation
up to international norms. Id. See also, G. Sullivan, The Bribery Act 2010:
Part I: an overview, 2 CRIM. L. REV. 87, 96–97 (2011) (U.K.).
88. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 96–97.
89. Id. (“Pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights and a
severe impediment to development and global security. We will work with
governments and civil society organisations to bring greater transparency
and accountability to government budgets, expenditures and the assets of
public officials.”)
90. Id. at 97 (“Obviously, the United States will want to pursue this increasingly robust anti-corruption strategy at least cost to its competitive position. One can anticipate various forms of encouragement from the United
States for the United Kingdom to do its bit.”).
91. Id. at 94 (“Perhaps the most significant role for this new offence is to
flag clearly that the United Kingdom is compliant with its treaty obligations
to combat the bribery of public officials.”).
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the U.K. Act makes it a distinct offense to bribe a foreign official.92 This offense appears to be somewhat redundant, or even
superfluous,93 considering that other provisions of the U.K. Act
adequately prohibit bribery. It seems that including the distinct offense of bribing foreign officials is meant to placate the
OECD by adopting similar language to that promulgated by
the Convention, and to visibly demonstrate the United Kingdom’s effort to expeditiously improve upon its anti-corruption
legislation.94
2. The U.K. Act and the Level Playing Field Approach
Through its anti-corruption legislation, the United Kingdom
also seeks to level the playing field, but not solely for the sake
of curbing unfair advantages.95 Bribery not only subverts the
marketplace, but also diverts funds from public projects to corrupt individuals.96 This results in a “human tragedy,” in which
“power is abused[,] the weak are exploited[, and] the dishonest
rewarded.”97 The U.K. Act aims to rectify that wrong and to
right the imbalance of power.98
92. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 6(1)–(8); Sullivan, supra note 87, at 94.
93. See id.
94. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 94. In regards to the specific offense of bribing a foreign official,
There is reason to doubt whether this offence makes any substantive
contribution to the criminalisation of bribery. Since 2001 UK corruption legislation has been given an extra-territorial dimension and it
is difficult to envisage conduct falling within the new foreign public
officials offence which would not also be covered by the two core
bribery offences, subject to any jurisdictional constraints. Additionally, where foreign officials are bribed on behalf of UK companies, the
companies are very likely to be exposed to liability under the failure
of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery offence, which has a
very wide jurisdictional base. Perhaps the most significant role for
this new offence is to flag clearly that the United Kingdom is compliant with its treaty obligations to combat the bribery of public officials.
Id.
95. Pope, supra note 82, at 480.
96. Id.
97. Id. (internal citations omitted).
98. See Cropp, supra note 50, at 124; see also Randal C. Archibald, Even as
It Hurts Mexican Economy, Bribery is Taken in Stride, N.Y. TIMES, April 23,
2012, at A4.
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3. The U.K. Act and the Public Trust Doctrines
Certain aspects of the U.K. Act also suggest that the drafters
of that statute considered “public trust” to be an important concept.99 The U.K. Act criminalizes conduct that induces a foreign
public official to improperly perform a relevant function or activity.100 When defining those relevant functions or activities,
the U.K. Act provides that the function or activity meet one of
three conditions, namely that the person performing the activity is expected to do so in good faith, is expected to perform it
impartially, or is in a “position of trust by virtue of performing
it.”101 The three preceding conditions are “relevant expectations” under the U.K. Act, and the official function is performed
improperly only if the performance breaches one of those “relevant expectations.”102 Section five of the Act provides a test to
determine the impropriety of given conduct.103 Notably, that
test is based on “what a reasonable person in the UK would expect in relation to the performance of the type of function or
activity concerned.”104 By adopting a reasonableness standard
that focuses only on the British perspective, this test disregards the local custom and practice of the country in which the
alleged action—i.e. bribery—may be taking place, unless that
country permits or requires the action in question under its
written law.105
The U.K. Act also appears to be influenced by the idea of corporate responsibility, or the corporate proconsul approach to
the public trust doctrine. This is evidenced in large part by
provisions that afford targeted companies defenses that hinge
on the company’s ability to prove internal cultures of responsibility. The Serious Frauds Office (“SFO”) “will expect to see not
just paper-compliance, but rather an anti-corruption culture,
‘fully and visibly supported at the highest levels’ in the commercial organization.”106 Some proponents of the public trust doctrine argue that the U.K. Act should aim for a “behavioural
99. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 88.
100. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 4; David Aaronberg & Nichola Higgins, The Bribery
Act 2010: All Bark and No Bite . . . ?, 2010 ARCHBOLD REV. 5, 6 (2010) (Eng.).
101. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 2.
102. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 4(2); Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 7.
103. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 5.
104. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 2.
105. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 91.
106. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 6 (emphasis in original).
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change” in corporate Britain such that “no form of corruption is
tolerated.”107
The United Kingdom’s implicit desire for corporate responsibility is clear, both from the fact that it is much easier to prosecute companies under the bribery statutes108 and from the fact
that the U.K. Act provides an adequate procedures exception.109
Lord Bach, the former Minister for Legal Aid, indicated in a
December 2009 letter to the House of Lords that,
[i]t is not our intention to drag well run companies before the
courts for every infraction. It would be wrong to leave organizations open to a heavy fine if a rogue element within its
ranks bribes on behalf of the organization when those who
manage it can show they have put in place procedures designed to prevent bribery on its behalf.110

The availability of the adequate procedures defense illustrates
that the United Kingdom is not simply interested in prosecuting companies for violating the U.K. Act.111 Rather, it is more
interested in encouraging companies to make meaningful
changes to their corporate culture and to make fighting corruption a priority.112 Companies would be more inclined to formulate effective compliance programs if they knew it would help
them avoid liability in the future.113 Indeed, the interplay between the “long-arm jurisdiction”114 and the adequate measures
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id. at 5, stating:
Section 7 [of the U.K. Act] is intended to make it much simpler to
prosecute such organizations for bribery offences. Previously prosecutors had to identify the directing will and mind within a company
at the time an offence was committed and obtain evidence of that
person’s knowledge and involvement. Unsurprisingly, there were few
prosecutions. Under the new Act, prosecutors will need only to prove
fault by an individual connected to a relevant organization—”A”—in
order to engage this section.
Id.; see also U.K. Act, c. 23, § 7.
109. Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 5.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1, 8.
113. See id. at 8.
114. The U.K. Act employs “long-arm jurisdiction” because, “nationals [and]
closely connected persons of the regulated country, including companies incorporated in the regulated country, can be prosecuted regardless of where
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defense strikes “an appropriate balance between the need to
aggressively police corrupt activities in foreign jurisdictions
and the need to protect corporations which have committed resources to establishing principles-based policies, procedures
and controls, notwithstanding the nefarious acts of the corporation’s employees or agents.”115
III. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A. History
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 following a confluence of
events—the Watergate scandal, an SEC investigation, and a
voluntary bribery disclosure program—that exposed the fact
that American companies had been making millions of dollars
in bribes to foreign officials.116 Congress responded to these
findings by amending the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
which resulted in the creation of the FCPA.117
The FCPA has two provisions: the anti-bribery prohibitions
and specific accounting requirements.118 The anti-bribery provisions addressed the corrupt practices by which American
businesses obtained business abroad, which frequently consisted of outright bribes to government officials or the payment of
fees to “consultants” who then acted as intermediaries to facilitate bribes.119 The accounting provisions addressed the accompanying “slush funds, off-book accounts and other financial
practices,” which served to conceal the corruption.120
The FCPA prohibits corruptly paying a foreign official money
or anything of value, either directly or indirectly, for certain
purposes.121 Those purposes include attempting to influence
any official act or decision, inducing the official to commit an

the corrupt activity took place around the world.” Cropp, supra note 50, at
136.
115. Cropp, supra note 50, at 136.
116. GREANIAS, supra note 61, at 1–3; McSorley, supra note 23, at 749–50;
Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of
Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 442
(Winter 2010).
117. McSorley, supra note 23, at 749–50.
118. Low, supra note 19, at 718.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1998).
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unlawful action, or trying to secure an improper business advantage.122
As noted in the Introduction of this Note, “foreign official”
under the FCPA is,
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public
international organization, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any
such public international organization.123

Judicial interpretation of “foreign official” is almost nonexistent. The court in Aguilar notes only that the FCPA does not
define instrumentality and the court in Aluminum Bahrain
B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc. reserved judgment on whether or not employees of a holding company owned by the government of Bahrain were “foreign officials” in terms of the FCPA.124
1. The FCPA and the Charming Betsy Doctrine
International pressure has had an impact on the creation of
the FCPA similar to that which influenced the U.K. Act.125 The
United States Congress adopted the FCPA, and incorporated it
into the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,126 following the
Watergate scandal.127 One main purpose of the FCPA was to
repair international perception of the American democracy after it had faltered.128 International views on anti-corruption,
and OECD policies in particular, also influenced specific provisions of the FCPA during the amendment processes, which oc-

122. Id.
123. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (1998).
124. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2011);
Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc., 2012 WL 2094029 at *3 (W.D. Pa.
June 11, 2012).
125. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125.
126. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS v, xvii (2d ed. 2010); Cropp, supra note 50, at 125.
127. The Watergate scandal unearthed “myriad illegal contributions to
President Nixon’s reelection campaign and corporate slush funds used to
bribe foreign officials and police.” Stephen A. Fraser, Placing The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act on The Tracks in The Race For Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV.
1009, 1010 (2012).
128. DEMING, supra note 126, at xvii, 3; Cropp, supra note 50, at 125 n.13.
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curred in 1988 and 1998.129 For example, the United States implemented the OECD suggestions through the 1998 amendments by extending the jurisdiction under the FCPA to include
considerations of the nationality of the perpetrators.130 The
1998 Amendments also expanded the FCPA to allow prosecution of “any person” that commits bribery, whether or not the
entity they work for was also prosecuted, where before only
corporate persons—not individuals—had been held liable.131
The amendments indicate that not only was the United States
conscious of its image abroad when it originally drafted the
FCPA, but it also continued to make an effort to conform with
international norms when it drafted the two rounds of amendments in 1988 and 1998.132
2. The FCPA and the Level Playing Field Approach
Given the United States’ pressure on the OECD and other
countries to adopt the level playing field approach, it follows
that one could read the FCPA, and thus define “foreign official,” in light of that same concept of fair competition.133 In
United States v. Kay, although not specifically addressing the
issue of defining “foreign official,” the Fifth Circuit subscribed
to the view that Congress intended generally for the FCPA to
promote fairness in competition.134 The Kay court considered
whether the illegal gain of tax reductions fell within the proscription of bribes that secure business abroad.135 The court
held that any payment to a foreign official that reduces a company’s costs—even if simply by reductions in customs duties
and other taxes—indirectly benefits the company and affords
an unfair advantage over its competitors in violation of the
FCPA.136
129. DEMING, supra note 126, at 3; Cropp, supra 50, at 125 n.18.
130. DEMING, supra note 126, at 7. Jurisdiction now depends only on
whether or not the person has status as an American citizen or national, or
whether an entity is subject to U.S. laws either by incorporation or because
its principal place of business is situated in the United States. Id. at 7–8.
131. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125.
132. DEMING, supra note 126, at xvii, 3, 7–8; see Cropp, supra note 50, at
125.
133. Cropp, supra note 50, at 125.
134. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Kay
I].
135. Id. at 747–48.
136. Id. at 749, 756.
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3. The FCPA and the Public Trust Doctrines
Not only does the international community view corruption
as an issue of public trust, but American judicial interpretation
of the FCPA also does the same.137 The court’s treatment of the
word “corruptly” in the FCPA is indicative of a traditional public trust model of analysis.138 The Second Circuit noted the similar usage of the word “corruptly” in the FCPA and in 18 U.S.C.
§ 201, pertaining to bribery of public officials and witnesses.139
In Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v.
Schreiber, the Second Circuit noted that, due to these similarities, Congress probably intended to incorporate the elements of
domestic bribery within the FCPA.140 Addressing bribery, the
court stated that it had “repeatedly held in [the 18 U.S.C. §
201] context that ‘a fundamental component of a ‘corrupt’ act is

Avoiding or lowering taxes reduces operating costs and thus increases profit margins, thereby freeing up funds that the business is otherwise legally obligated to expend. And this, in turn, enables it to
take any number of actions to the disadvantage of competitors. Bribing foreign officials to lower taxes and customs duties certainly can
provide an unfair advantage over competitors and thereby be of assistance to the payor in obtaining or retaining business.
Id. at 749.
137. See Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173 (2d Cir.
2003) [hereinafter Schreiber]; see also United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432
(5th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Kay II].
138. See Schreiber, 327 F.3d at 174.
139. Schreiber, 327 F.3d at 182–83. 18 U.S.C. § 201 refers to the Bribery of
Public Officials and Witnesses. Subsection (b) provides in pertinent part that
whoever,
(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything
of value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a
public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person
who has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value
to any other person or entity, with intent— (A) to influence any official act . . . shall be fined under this title or not more than three
times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is
greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and
may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
under the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 201 (emphasis added).
140. Schreiber, 327 F.3d at 182–83.
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a breach of some official duty owed to the government or the
public at large.’”141 The Second Circuit had elaborated previously on the concept of a breach of trust in United States v.
Rooney, reporting that “‘[b]ribery in essence is an attempt to
influence another to disregard his duty while continuing to appear devoted to it or to repay trust with disloyalty.”142 In making these findings, the court emphasized that it is the public
who suffer when dishonest officials fail to serve them as they
had been entrusted to do.143
Beyond the interpretation of the word “corruptly,” American
jurisprudence has also indicated that the FCPA as a whole is a
statute about public trust.144 In United States v. Kay, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to enhance the defendant’s sentence for violating the FCPA. The court predicated
this enhancement upon the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which specifically allow for increased punishment if the
defendant abused a position of trust.145 Until this decision, no
court had decided whether the FCPA qualified as a violation of
public trust deserving of a sentencing enhancement. The Fifth
Circuit held that violation of the FCPA, like embezzlement or
fraud, did indeed warrant a sentencing enhancement for abuse
of public trust.146
The FCPA can also be analyzed in light of the corporate proconsul variation of the public trust doctrine. This version of the
public trust doctrine developed as the American corporate environment shifted from focusing solely on profitability to also
considering social responsibility.147 This shift led to the “idea of
the corporation as a means for implementing public policy.
[The] idea of the business enterprise as government proconsul,”148 and the FCPA was an example of the federal government using the corporation as a proconsul in foreign affairs.149
The concept of the corporation as a government proconsul arguably developed because, “[the] American government [had]
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 182.
United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id.
See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 460 (5th Cir. 2007).
Kay II, at 460; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, 18 U.S.C.
Kay II, at 460.
GREANIAS, supra note 61, at 39.
Id.
Id.
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come to realize . . . that enormous economic power is the power
to affect society at large.”150 In the United States, the bulk of
economic power has been organized in the corporate form.151
“To effect major social change, it thus is argued, one must harness [the] enormous potential [of this corporate form].”152
Hence, American corporations became a leading force in reforms relating to racial and sexual discrimination, environmental protection, and equal employment.153 Likewise, the FCPA
developed from this corporate proconsul concept, and “[i]n a
sense . . . is an extension of the corporate-governance movement.”154 Indeed, the FCPA’s implementation illustrated that
“very little of the system that gave rise to the proconsular
strategy ha[d] been dismantled.”155 Therefore, a corporate proconsular analysis of the term “foreign official” may help solidify
a precise and more general working definition.
B. Judicially Defining “Foreign Official”
American courts have acknowledged the undefined nature of
“foreign official” under the FCPA; however, they have only provided limited assistance in remedying the issue. In fact, this
uncertainty has allowed for a broadening of the term “foreign
official,” causing problems for American business.156 Because
most cases settle before reaching trial,157 “judges have given
little guidance as to what the FCPA’s bewildering text actually
means. So, for now, it means whatever an aggressive prosecutor says it does.”158
In addition to those defendants that neatly fit the statutory
definition, federal prosecutors have been identifying individuals employed by state-owned companies as “foreign officials.”159
Doing so has made it difficult for companies to assess when
their activities may come under the purview of the FCPA, especially when operating in markets in which wholly and partially
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Hilzenrath, Spot?, supra note 31.
Cohen, supra note 37, at 1245–46.
The Economist, supra note 16.
Hilzenrath, Spot?, supra note 31.
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state-owned companies are common.160 This, in turn, adversely
affects American companies looking to do business in foreign
markets.161 Consequently, businesses have begun challenging
the imprecision of “foreign official” in their defense of allegations of FCPA violations. United States v. Aguilar and Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc are two such cases.
1. United States v. Aguilar
The “foreign official” question surfaced in United States v.
Aguilar, which was litigated in the Central District of California in 2011.162 Keith E. Lindsey,163 Steve K. Lee,164 and Lindsey
Manufacturing Company165 (“the Lindsey Defendants”), were
charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and with substantive violations of the FCPA. In the same case, two Mexican citizens, Enrique Aguilar166 and his wife Angela Aguilar167 (“the
Aguilar Defendants”), faced the same charges, inter alia, as the
Lindsey Defendants.168 The jury found the Lindsey Defendants
and Angela Aguilar guilty of violating the FCPA, a first in the
prosecutorial history of the FCPA since most defendants choose
to settle before trial.169 The defense, however, fought for dis160. Id.
161. Id.
162. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1108–10 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
163. Keith E. Lindsey was the President of Lindsey Manufacturing and as
such, he “had ultimate authority over all of defendant Lindsey Manufacturing’s operations.” Furthermore, Mr. Lindsey “also had a majority ownership
interest in defendant Lindsey Manufacturing.” Id. at 1111.
164. Steve K. Lee was the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
Lindsey Manufacturing, and as such, he controlled Lindsey Manufacturing’s
finances. Id.
165. Lindsey Manufacturing Company, incorporated and headquartered in
Azusa, California, is a privately held company that manufactures emergency
restoration systems and other equipment for use by electrical utility companies. Additionally, “[m]any of defendant Lindsey Manufacturing’s clients
were foreign, state-owned utilities, including [Comisión Federal de Electricidad (“CFE”)].” Id.
166. Enrique Aguilar, a director of Grupo International, was hired by Lindsey Manufacturing to obtain contracts with CFE for them. Id.
167. Angela Aguilar was an officer and director of Grupo International and
as such managed the company’s finances. Id.
168. Id. at 1109 n.1, 1111.
169. Lindsey Manufacturing Defendants Convicted On All Counts, WALL ST.
J., May
10,
2011,
available
at
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
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missal170 of the indictment based on grounds of prosecutorial
misconduct.171 The court granted the defense’s motion, threw
out the convictions of the Lindsey Defendants, and dismissed
the indictment.172 Although the indictment ultimately was
dismissed, the court’s treatment of “foreign official” is still informative as to one member of the judiciary’s view on the matter.
The indictment stemmed from the bribery of two highly
ranked officials, Nestor Moreno and Arturo Hernandez, of the
Mexican utility company Comisión Federal de Electricidad
(“CFE”),173 which is wholly state-owned.174 The Lindsey Defendants allegedly made payments to the Aguilar Defendants
currents/2011/05/10/lindsey-manufacturing-defendants-convicted-on-allcounts/tab/print/ [hereinafter WSJ, Lindsey]. Enrique Aguilar was not convicted, as he was a fugitive and therefore not on trial. Id.
170. The Government responded by filing the Government’s Response to the
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment with Prejudice Due to Alleged Repeated and Intentional Government Misconduct on September 5, 2011. USA v. Noriega et al, 2:10CR01031.
171. As reported in the May 10, 2011 Wall Street Journal article,
Jan L. Handzlik of Greenberg Traurig LLP, who represented Azusa,
Calif.-based Lindsey, and its president, Keith Lindsey, said, “We are
very disappointed by the jury’s verdict.”
“We continue to believe in our clients’ innocence and will pursue our
motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct,” said Handzlik.
WSJ, Lindsey, supra note 169.
172. See United States v. Aguilar, 831 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1182 (C.D. Cal.
2011). The court found that
[t]he Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully before the grand jury, inserted material falsehoods into affidavits submitted to magistrate judges in support of applications for
search warrants and seizure warrants, improperly reviewed e-mail
communications between one Defendant and her lawyer, recklessly
failed to comply with its discovery obligations, posed questions to
certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s rulings, engaged in questionable behavior during closing argument and even made misrepresentations to the Court.
Id.
173. The Mexican Government owned CFE, an electric utility company that
was responsible for supplying electricity to all of Mexico aside from Mexico
City. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
174. Id.
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through the Aguilars’ company, Grupo International De Asesores S.A. (“Grupo International”).175 The Aguilar Defendants
then allegedly routed large portions of those payments to the
CFE officers as bribes.176 According to prosecutors,
[f]or a government official, Nestor Moreno lived pretty large.
Moreno, the director of operations for Mexico’s nationalized
electricity monopoly, drove a $297,000 Ferrari and owned a
$1.8-million yacht named Dream Seeker.
Moreno couldn’t afford these luxuries on his salary at the
Federal Electricity Commission in Mexico City. Instead, U.S.
prosecutors alleged, they were gifts from [Lindsey Manufacturing Company,] an Azusa company that was peddling its
electricity transmission equipment to foreign buyers.177

Before winning on their prosecutorial misconduct claim, the
Lindsey and Aguilar Defendants originally moved to dismiss
the indictment on the grounds that officers or employees of
state-owned corporations should not be considered “foreign officials” under the FCPA, arguing that “under no circumstances
can a state-owned corporation be a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government.”178 However, the court
rejected this argument, denied the motion to dismiss, and stated that CFE could be considered an “instrumentality” of the
Mexican government and therefore come within the reach of
the FCPA. Thus, Mr. Moreno and Mr. Hernandez found themselves within the folds of the FCPA as “foreign officials.”179
The Aguilar court noted, however, that “[t]he FCPA does not
define ‘instrumentality,’”180 and then undertook a discussion of
what the word “instrumentality” may mean in terms of the
FCPA.181 Both sets of defendants suggested that “instrumental-

175. Grupo International was incorporated in Panama and headquartered
in Mexico. Grupo International claimed to provide sales representation services to companies doing business with CFE and would receive a percentage
of the revenue that companies like Lindsey Manufacturing gained from their
contracts with CFE. Id. at 1111.
176. Id.
177. Stuart Pfeifer, COURTS: Bribes to foreign firms are targeted, L.A.
TIMES, March 11, 2011.
178. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
179. Id. at 1119–20.
180. Id. at 1112 (emphasis in original).
181. Id. at 1113–20.
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ity” should be interpreted in light of the two words preceding it
in the statute: “agency” and “department.”182 In light of this
preceding language, they asserted, “instrumentality” should
only include entities that possess the characteristics that are
common to both “agencies” and “departments.”183 The court entertained this argument, although it did not ultimately agree
with it,184 and proposed a “non-exclusive list”185 of the characteristics that are consistent between agencies and departments:
• The entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in
many cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction.
• The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government officials.
• The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through
governmental appropriations or through revenues obtained as
a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as entrance fees to a national park.
• The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its designated functions.
• The entity is widely perceived and understood to be performing official (i.e., governmental) functions.186

The court continued the plain meaning analysis of “instrumentality” by considering how the FCPA uses the term, starting with a review of the structure, objective, and policy of the
FCPA as a whole.187 Having been defeated in their first effort,
the defendants now argued that the FCPA focuses on only the
bribery of governments and politicians and that this limitation
was evident by Congress’ decision not to criminalize all foreign

182. Id. at 1114.
183. Id.
184. The Aguilar court disagreed with the defendants’ “all or nothing” view
that “a state-owned corporation can never be an ‘instrumentality’ because
state-owned corporations ‘do not always’ share the characteristics of departments or agencies.” The Court indicated that such a view is illogical as it fails
to account for that which it “implicitly concedes,” namely, “that some stateowned corporations can and do share the characteristics of departments and
agencies.” Id. at 1115 (emphasis in original).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1115–16.
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bribery during the drafting and amending processes.188 The
government countered that the FCPA should instead be construed according to the Charming Betsy doctrine.189
The court ultimately found the government’s Charming Betsy
argument to be persuasive, focusing on the fact that the United
States signed onto, and amended the FCPA in accordance with,
the OECD Convention.190 The OECD Convention defined “foreign public official” to include “any person exercising a public
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or
public enterprise . . . ,” and defines “public enterprise” as “any
enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a government, or governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise a
dominant influence.”191 After signing the OECD Convention,
the United States amended the FCPA in 1998 to include the
OECD language “public international organizations” in its definition of “foreign official.”192 The defense in Aguilar found it
notable, however, that whereas Congress had added “public
international organizations” into its definition of “foreign official” to conform with the OECD, it did not add “public enterprise” into the definition.193
Both the government and the defense relied heavily on analyses of the FCPA legislative history to determine what Congress intended to fall within the meaning of “foreign official.”194
The defense argued that not only did Congress fail to insert
“public enterprise” during the 1998 Amendment process, but
they had also declined to target bribes intended to influence
state-owned corporations when faced with previous opportunities to do so.195 More specifically, “Congress rejected proposed
bills that explicitly addressed payments to employees of stateowned corporations.”196 The failure of proposed Senate Bill of
August 6, 1976, which would have defined “foreign official” as
“essentially, officers, employees or others acting on behalf of a
188. Id. at 1115.
189. Id. at 1116; Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
117–18, 2 L.ED. 208 (1804).
190. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
191. Id. at 1116 (citing OECD Convention, art. 1) (emphasis in original).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1118.
194. Id. at 1117–19.
195. Id. at 1118.
196. Id. at 1117.
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foreign government” and would have included state-owned corporations in the meaning of “foreign government,”197 exemplifies one such rejection. Additionally, during a prior round of
amendments to the FCPA in 1988, the amenders focused on
“routine government action.”198 The Aguilar defendants
claimed the “routine government action” focus in 1988 was further evidence that Congress did not consider corporations to be
included in that definition.199 Lastly, as previously mentioned,
Congress had a chance in 1998 to explicitly include “public enterprise” when amending the FCPA following the OECD Convention but did not do so.200
The government addressed the FCPA legislative history by
arguing that the FCPA’s failure to mention explicitly stateowned companies did not mean that Congress meant to exclude
them entirely.201 Further, the government maintained that
when Congress uses a general term such as “instrumentality,”
it necessarily includes the more specific examples within that,
such as state-owned company or public enterprise.202
Although the court acknowledged both sides of the legislative
history debate, it ultimately held that, “the legislative history
of the FCPA is inconclusive.”203 The court further stated that,
“[a]lthough it does not demonstrate that Congress intended to
include all state-owned corporations within the ambit of the
FCPA, neither does it provide support for Defendants’ insistence that Congress intended to exclude all such corporations
from the ambit of the FCPA.”204 The court’s refusal to clarify
the meaning of “foreign official” by issuing such vague and inconclusive language resulted in a continued—if not heightened—confusion regarding the meaning of the term, and a definitive definition remains elusive.

197. Id.
198. Id. at 1118 (emphasis omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1118–19.
202. Id. at 1119.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc, 2012 WL 2094029,
at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012) (holding that the question of whether employees of a state-owned holding company are “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA is an issue of fact for the jury).
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2. Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc.
The Western District of Pennsylvania addressed the “foreign
official” question in June 2012 in Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v.
Alcoa Inc.205 Aluminum Bahrain (“Alba”), a holding company
owned by the government of Bahrain, alleged various fraud,
conspiracy, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orgnaizations Act (“RICO”) claims against defendant William Rice.206
These claims included an allegation that Rice was involved in
illegal payments to foreign officials, and specifically alleged
that “Bruce Hall, Zamil Al Joweiser and Yousif Shirawi, all executives and agents of Alba, received millions of dollars in
bribes by virtue of their employment with Alba.”207 Rice moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.208 The
court denied Rice’s motion to dismiss.209
The Alcoa court held, inter alia, that the status of employees
of Alba as “foreign officials” was still a question of fact. The
court’s leaving of the “foreign official” question to interpretation by the fact-finder means that the term is still undefined. It
also suggests that the factors constituting a “foreign official”
are case sensitive, rather than determinable as a matter of law.
Thus, with the meaning of “foreign official” rendered a question
of fact, the definition is open to even further broadening, the
full breadth dependent on the determination of the fact-finder
within the given case. Alcoa, like Aguilar, was one of the few
instances where an FCPA case made it to trial rather than settling,210 making it one of the few opportunities to define “foreign official” judicially. Like the earlier case, the Alcoa court’s
decision to leave this question to the fact-finder created more
uncertainty and prolonged the “foreign official” issue.
The Eleventh Circuit will have an opportunity to assess the
scope of “foreign official” in United States v. Esquenazi, in
which the United States filed its appellate brief on August 21,
2012.211 It will have a chance to review the legislative history of
the FCPA and “any and all other sources” that may assist in
205. Alcoa, 2012 WL 2094029, at *1.
206. Id., at *1, *3.
207. Id. at *3.
208. Id. at *1.
209. Id.
210. Cohen, supra note 37, at 1245–46.
211. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 1115331-C (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 3638390 at *1.
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disambiguating the term “foreign official,” and, if circumstances demand, it could decide to apply the rule of lenity and construe the definition in favor of the defendants.212 Using the following three lenses could be effective in helping the court untangle the information, and perhaps nail down a definition of
“foreign official.”
IV. ANALYZING “FOREIGN OFFICIAL” UNDER THE THREE LENSES
The Aguilar court posed a hypothetical as to whether the
president of PEMEX is a “foreign official,” discussed at the beginning of this Note.213 As was made apparent in Aguilar and
Alcoa, the FCPA legislative history is inconclusive, and no level
of the judiciary has really spoken on the matter of “foreign official” either.214 Therefore, to reach an answer, or at least a possible path towards an answer, it may be instructive to view the
particular concept of “foreign official” in the same manner in
which this Note analyzed the OECD Convention, the U.K. Act,
and the FCPA in general. The three proposed lenses—the
Charming Betsy Doctrine, the Level Playing Field approach,
and the Public Trust doctrines—may help refine the analysis
and bring a definition of “foreign official” into focus.
A. “Foreign Official” and the Charming Betsy Doctrine
Since complying with international norms was one of Congress’ motivating factors behind enacting and drafting the
FCPA, one way to parse the statute’s definition of “foreign official” would be to mirror those of the international community.
Both the OECD and the United Kingdom subscribe to a definition of “foreign official” broader than strictly an officer or employee of a foreign government. The OECD Convention provides that a “foreign public official” is “any person holding a
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country,
whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or
public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international organization.”215 The OECD Convention specifies that a
212. See United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
213. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119–20 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
214. See supra Part III.B.
215. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 31.
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“‘foreign country’ includes all levels and subdivisions of government, from national to local.”216 The U.K. Act also includes
within the definition of “foreign public official”217 anyone that
performs a public function “for any public agency or public enterprise of that country or territory (or subdivision of such
country or territory.)”218 The “public enterprise” language in
both the OECD Convention provision and the U.K. Act prohibits bribing employees or agents of state-owned corporations.219
As noted, “foreign official” in the FCPA is still not as well defined as it is under either the OECD Convention or the U.K.
Act. The definition of “foreign official” in the FCPA was modified in 1998 to slightly mirror the language of the OECD Convention definition by including “any official or employee of a
public international organization or any individual or entity
acting on behalf of a public international organization.”220
However, there are still some uncertainties as to what exactly
the definition of “foreign official” includes. Under the FCPA,
[t]he term ‘foreign official’ means any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any
such government or department, agency, or instrumentality,
or for or on behalf of any such public international organization. 221

The use of the word “instrumentality” is ambiguous, as was
discussed by the Aguilar court.222 The term is broad and can
encompass persons that would not otherwise appear to be “foreign officials,” such as employees of companies owned in whole
or in part by a state government.223 However, inclusion of stateowned company employees is not specifically provided for with216. Id.
217. The OECD Convention and the U.K. Bribery Act employ the term “foreign public official” while the FCPA uses the term “foreign official.” See
OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 31; U.K. Act, c. 23, § 6(5); 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-1(f)(1).
218. U.K. Act, c. 23, § 6(5)(b)(ii).
219. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 31; U.K. Act, c. 23, § 6(5)(b)(ii).
220. OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 20.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1).
222. See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115–16 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
223. Cropp, supra note 50, at 136.
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in the act.224 If the U.S. Congress were to follow the Charming
Betsy doctrine, then it would likely include public enterprises
and agents thereof in its definition of “foreign official,” sweeping employees of state-owned corporations into the reach of the
FCPA. Though Congress had a chance to modify the FCPA in
this manner but chose instead to leave it broadly defined, the
court in Aguilar appears to follow the path charted by the
OECD and the United Kingdom.225 Furthermore, the court in
Aguilar noted that the FCPA does not define “instrumentality,”
which in turn lends ambiguity to the definition of “foreign official.”226 The court also indicated that using the FCPA’s legislative history to interpret the meanings of those terms is inconclusive and the court should instead construe the terms according to the Charming Betsy doctrine.227 The court therefore was
persuaded that the definition of foreign official should be examined with the lens provided by the OECD Convention.228
International norms regarding the meaning of “foreign official” would lend support to the United States’ decision to include persons working for corporations wholly owned or partially owned by states in its own definition.229 Thus, if construing the PEMEX situation according to the Charming Betsy doctrine, looking to international sources such as the U.K. Act,
then “foreign official” would be defined broadly and would include the president of PEMEX as a “foreign official.”230 Exxon
would therefore be subject to prosecution under the FCPA.231
B. “Foreign Official” and The Level Playing Field Approach
To consider a definition of “foreign official” that levels the
playing field, one could look to the Kay court for support. The
Kay court’s view of anti-corruption legislation as a means to
level the playing field in international markets is in line with
the general value of fair competition that underlies the FCPA
224. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1).
225. See id. at 1117.
226. Id. at 1112.
227. Id. at 1116 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 117–18, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804)).
228. Id. at 1117.
229. See OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 31; see also Bribery Act, 2010,
c. 23, § 6(5) (Eng.).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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itself, the OECD Convention, and the U.K. Act.232 Applying this
concept to the “foreign official” issue would likely result in a
broad definition, since any kind of bribery, whether involving
public officials or private persons, would create an unfair advantage.233
Assessing the PEMEX hypothetical according to the level
playing field doctrine reaches a similar conclusion. The level
playing field approach aims to eradicate bribery of any kind in
order to create a fair and competitive marketplace, so Exxon’s
undue influence on PEMEX’s decision in awarding the contract
would also be subject to prosecution under this analysis.234
C. “Foreign Official” and the Public Trust Doctrines
Superimposing the public trust concept on the definition of
“foreign official” may not necessarily support a broad-based definition.235 Although the OECD version of the public trust doctrine includes the abuse of private office,236 other adaptations,
including that of the United States, seem to indicate that the
doctrine would only pertain to public officials.237 However, the
corporate proconsul variation of the doctrine does seem to sug232. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf
(House of Representatives Committee Report accompanying the proposed bill
to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to address the problem of
corporations engaging in questionable or illegal payments to government officials); OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 2; Pope, supra note 82, at 480.
233. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, supra note 232, at 4–5.
The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, foreign political parties or candidates for foreign political office is unethical. It is counter to the moral expectations and values of
the American public. But not only is it unethical, it is bad business
as well. It erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market
system. It short-circuits the marketplace by directing business to
those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality
or service, or too lazy to engage in honest salesmanship, or too intent
upon unloading marginal products. In short, it rewards corruption
instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower
their standards or risk losing business.
Id.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See id.
OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 19, 20.
See id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
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gest that a public trust definition of “foreign official” could be
broader than originally contemplated.238
In view of this alternate iteration of the public trust doctrine,
the scope of “foreign official” under that analytical lens is expanded.239 Whereas the traditional public trust doctrine might
have limited “foreign officials” to individuals squarely in the
public sphere, the corporate proconsul approach opens the door
to liability of private individuals as well.240 If corporations can
be guardians of public trust by virtue of being financial powerhouses, then it would be fair to include the associated individuals as a form of official encompassed by the FCPA.241 Therefore,
adhering to the corporate proconsul adaptation of the public
trust model rather than the conventional version would support instead a broader definition of “foreign official,” more like
the scope of definitions sustained by the Charming Betsy and
level playing field lenses.
In sum, the traditional public trust doctrine would apparently prosecute the president of PEMEX only if he were clearly an
official of the Mexican government, rather than the president
of a corporation that happens to be state-owned.242 However,
when the alternate version of the public trust doctrine—the
corporate proconsul approach—is taken into consideration, this
analytical model would conclude that Exxon’s actions were violative of the FCPA.243
It is probably most prudent to define “foreign official” according to the corporate proconsul variant of the public trust lens.
Given the expanding influence of corporations, this view would
likewise expand their accountability. Broadly defining “foreign
official” in terms of public trust would satisfy the motivations
of the other models as well. The “foreign officials” are trusted to
serve the public dutifully, and it is possible that the public
could intend for those trusted officials to serve in a way that
would not offend international norms or unfairly skew the
playing field. Furthermore, “resort[ing] to any and all other
sources,” did not “still result in a tie,” so application of the rule
of lenity would not be necessary and courts would not be re238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

GREANIAS, supra note 61, at 44.
See id. at 46; Aaronberg, supra note 100, at 8.
GREANIAS, supra note 61, at 46.
See id.
See OECD, GLOSSARY, supra note 57, at 19–20.
GREANIAS, supra note 61, at 46; see supra Part III.D.
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quired to construe “foreign official” narrowly in favor of the defendants.244 Therefore, using the public trust doctrine to identify who is a “foreign official” would satisfy the proponents of
each analytical lens, while also adjusting to the modernizing
world in which corporations are increasingly situated in positions of public trust.
CONCLUSION
Whichever lens Congress or the courts decide to use to examine the problem of defining “foreign official,” it will likely direct
their focus to a broad definition encompassing certain private
individuals in addition to government officials.245 As for the
PEMEX hypothetical, Exxon will likely find itself in trouble no
matter which way the court views “foreign official.”
Katherine M. Morgan

244. See United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
245. See supra Part IV.
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OVER-DETENTION: ASYLUM-SEEKERS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND PATH
DEPENDENCY
INTRODUCTION

W

e have seen this problem before.1 We have examined the
shocking case studies of asylum-seekers detained categorically and for prolonged periods of time before.2 We have
watched the United States shirk their international legal commitments to ensure the dignity and humanity of refugees before.3 Yet despite the ongoing outcry of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)4 and legal scholars,5 and despite recent
attempts by the United States government to improve the immigration system,6 little has been done to adequately improve
the plight of detained asylum-seekers desperate to avoid removal to a country in which they are likely to face persecution.7
1. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in El Paso, Texas (May 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Remarks
by
the
President]
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/10/remarks-presidentcomprehensive-immigration-reform-el-paso-texas) (“[T]he truth is, we’ve often wrestled with the politics of who is and who isn’t allowed to come into
this country. This debate is not new.”).
2. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, Excessive Use of Detention, in AMERICAN
JUSTICE THROUGH IMMIGRANTS’ EYES 59, 59–72 (2004) [hereinafter A.B.A.].
3. See, e.g., Bridget Kessler, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Problem? A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 571 (2009).
4. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS:
SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON (2009) [hereinafter SEEKING
PROTECTION],
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf.
5. See, e.g., A.B.A., supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with
the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Exercising
Prosecutorial
Discretion],
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
7. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6 (establishing prosecutorial discretion policy), with Julia Preston, Obama Policy on Deporting Used Unevenly, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2011, at A16 (alleging that despite the factors to be considered in light of the prosecutorial discretion policy
some groups see less benefits than others).
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Against a backdrop of domestic concern—exacerbated by the
attacks of 9/118—that immigration carries inherent risks, the
United States has detained non-citizens of all types for a variety of reasons9 and pursuant to broad legal mandates.10 While
there are admittedly some conditions under which detention
can be a legitimate governmental function, many countries often subject entrants to detention that is “arbitrary” or “unnecessary” in violation of international human rights laws and
norms.11 In the United States, the decision to categorically detain asylum-seekers—despite the existence of potential solutions in the international community, including successful

8. Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, Foreword to A.B.A., supra note 2, at v.
The horrific September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York City
and Washington, D.C. fundamentally changed the way our nation of
immigrants views itself. Shameful episodes of anti-immigrant violence immediately after the attacks grabbed most of the headlines.
But the more significant shift has played out more quietly in federal
government offices where immigration policy is made. The United
States government, acting on a new urgency to control immigration
and American borders, has tightened an array of regulations that affect how people from other countries may enter or live in the United
States.
Id. While the 9/11 terror attacks perhaps intensified this fear, the concern
about the link between immigration and domestic terrorism may have begun
much earlier. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Immigration Hurts City, New
Yorkers Say in Poll, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at B4.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF.OF IMMIGR.STAT. ANN. REP.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS],
available
at
IMMIGRATION
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar2010.pdf (“Foreign nationals may be removable . . . for violations including
failure to abide by the terms and conditions of admission or engaging in
crimes such as violent crimes, document and benefit fraud, terrorist activity,
and drug smuggling.”). While this Note will hone in upon the detention of
refugees and asylum-seekers, it is important to remember that these groups
are just a portion of the non-citizen population detained each year. See id.
10. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (expedited removal and, thus,
mandatory detention, for all aliens arriving without having gone through the
proper immigration channels).
11. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Alternatives to Detention of
Asylum Seekers and Refugees, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. POLAS/2006/03 (Apr. 2006)
(by Ophelia Field & Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Alternatives to Detention]
(finding that many states presume detention for asylum-seekers despite contrary interpretations of international laws).
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NGO pilot efforts which use individualized risk-analysis12 and
“Alternatives to Detention”13 (“ATD”) programs—may amount
to unnecessary or arbitrary detention that violates international human rights law.14 The arbitrary and unnecessary nature of these detentions may have a particularly egregious impact on the class of asylum-seekers15 affected, where the depri12. Risk analysis is used in this Note to mean an individualized determination of a detained asylum-seeker’s eligibility for parole or release to an Alternatives to Detention program, which includes an assessment of that individual determining identity, risk of flight, potential for posing danger to the
community, or regarding any other justification for release. See SEEKING
PROTECTION, supra note 4, at 72–73.
13. “Alternatives to detention” is a term of art meaning an “alternative
means of increasing the appearance and compliance of individual asylum
seekers with asylum procedures and of meeting other legitimate concerns
which States have attempted to address . . . through recourse to detention.”
Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶ 4. They will be discussed in
more depth throughout this Note.
14. See, e.g., UNHCR, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of
Person and ‘Alternatives to Detention’ of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless
Persons and Other Migrants, 51–87, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/01.Rev.1 (Apr.
2011) (by Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Back to Basics]; Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 1–2 (presuming detention may violate international
law).
15. A subtle distinction exists between a refugee and an asylum-seeker;
the United States defines refugees as those seeking protection before they
arrive in the country while asylum-seekers are seeking protection after arriving in the United States. DANIEL C. MARTIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STAT. ANN. FLOW REP., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2010, at 1,
4 (2011). The Department of Homeland Security further separates affirmative asylum-seekers, who apply for asylum at a port of entry or within one
year of arrival in the United States, from defensive asylum-seekers, who file
for asylum in order to avoid removal or those who are subject to expedited
removal. Id. at 4. In contrast, international discourse distinguishes asylumseekers from refugees on the basis that asylum-seekers “are individuals who
have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status
have not yet been determined,” that is, their cases are still pending. 2009
UNHCR Stat. Y.B. 13, http://www.unhcr.org/4ce532ff9.html. The distinction
is irrelevant for the purposes of this Note because the language within U.S.
statutes grants authorization to seek asylum to the same non-citizens as
those protected in the international definitions of “refugee.” Compare 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (2012) with Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees [Refugee Convention], art. 1, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 and Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees [Protocol to Refugee Convention], Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. This Note will focus on defensive asylum-seekers
who announce their intention to seek asylum at the port of entry to the Unit-
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vation of liberty can exacerbate the traumas that led to their
flight from their country of origin in the first place.16
The United States has recognized that the immigration system needs work.17 In the detention context, the United States
has identified the need to incorporate risk analysis tools18 and
ATDs in order to improve the process.19 However, the steps the
United States has taken to develop and implement these tools
have significantly deviated from the recommendations of experts in the field20 and have failed thus far to bring the country
ed States and are thus trying to escape expedited removal and mandatory
detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
16. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE
INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (2000) [hereavailable
at
inafter
VERA],
http://www.vera.org/download?file=615/finalreport.pdf (“[D]etaining every
noncitizen is neither just nor humane. Many people in removal proceedings
are fleeing persecution in their own countries . . . Detention is an ordeal they
should be spared.”).
17. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
(2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_bluepri
nt.pdf.
18. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. AND CUST.
ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
20–21 (2009), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/icedetention-rpt.pdf. Dr. Schriro’s report identified a need for a “validated risk
assessment instrument specifically calibrated for the U.S. alien population.
The tool should assess initial and ongoing suitability for participation [in
ATDs].” Id. at 20.
19. Id.
20. LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE, UNLOCKING LIBERTY: A
WAY FORWARD FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION POLICY 21 (2011) [hereinafter
UNLOCKING
LIBERTY]
available
at
http://lirs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCKINGLIBERTY.pdf. Asylum experts
relevant to this Note include international bodies, such as the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees and the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme, and NGOs like Amnesty International, Human
Rights First, Vera Institute of Justice, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service, and International Detention Coalition. See UNHCR, UNHCR’s Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, (Feb. 26 1999), [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines] available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b3f844.html; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended
Practice, UNHCR, U.N. Doc. EC/49/SC/CRP.13 (Jun. 4 1999) [hereinafter ExCom on Detention]; Amnesty Int’l, Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers:
Alternatives to Immigration Detention, AI Index POL 33/001/2009 (April 1,
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into compliance with international law.21 This Note argues that
unless the United States incorporates the recommendations of
asylum experts to use thorough risk-analysis in creating an individualized ATD program, it will be unlikely to reduce the unnecessary or arbitrary detention of many asylum-seekers and
will therefore be unable to meet the minimum human rights
standards required under international law.22
Part I of this Note looks at the current U.S. immigration detention system and some of the now well-established failures of
the asylum detention process preventing the country from conforming to international human rights laws and norms. Part II
explores the rationales behind detention of asylum-seekers
with an eye toward how risk-analysis and ATDs can improve
the system. Part III analyzes the current momentum for reform
of the system in the context of path dependency, the notion that
the future of the system will be dependent upon—and constrained by—decisions made now,23 and addresses why it is essential to implement the recommendations of asylum experts
now. Part IV discusses how the United States, by ignoring the
recommendations of asylum experts regarding risk-analysis
and alternatives to detention, has continuously violated international law. Part V lists the additional policy benefits to the
United States should it adopt the proposed changes of asylum
experts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Current Status of the Detention System
Since its transition from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to its current home as a subset of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Immigration
2009) [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l]; SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA,
supra note 16; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20; R. SAMPSON ET AL., THE
INTERNATIONAL DETENTION COALITION, THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES: A HANDBOOK
FOR PREVENTING UNNECESSARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2011) available at
http://idcoalition.org/cap/handbook/.
21. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Preston, supra note 7.
22. E.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20; Alternatives to Detention,
supra note 11.
23. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
332, 332 (1985).
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and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division has rapidly expanded the scope of its detention power and the numerical capacity
of individuals in detention.24 The United Nations has defined
detention as “the deprivation of liberty in a confined place, such
as a prison or purpose-built reception or holding centre. It is at
the extreme end of the spectrum of deprivations of liberty . . .
.”25 In the U.S. immigration context, the purview of detention
includes “the authority . . . to detain aliens who may be subject
to removal for violations of administrative immigration law.”26
Throughout fiscal year 2010, ICE detained 363,064 noncitizens.27 ICE now has bed-space to house 33,400 detainees
daily and averages 33,330 detainees per day—a notable increase from the daily average of 27,990 in 2007.28 As of 2009,
asylum-seekers constituted about 1400 of these daily detainee
totals.29 In addition to a budget of over $2 billion for its immigration Detention and Removal Office (“DRO”), Congress gave
DHS unsolicited additional funding to increase the total number of beds by 600, to 34,000 total, in fiscal year 2012.30 The
24. See SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 2, 4.
25. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 8. See also Michael Flynn, Immigration Detention and Proportionality, Global Detention Project, Working Paper
No.
4,
7–9
(Feb.
2011),
available
at
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/publications/GDP_detention_
and_proportionality_workingpaper.pdf (“Coming up with a one-size-fits-all
definition [of detention] is a challenging undertaking, especially when assessing a phenomenon that can radically change shape from one country to
the next.”); Holding Patterns: Can Advocacy Efforts to Reform Migration Detention Inadvertently Lead to the Growth of Detention Regimes?, OPEN
SOCIETY
INSTITUTE,
34:00–38:40
(March
28,
2012),
http://c482907.r7.cf2.rackcdn.com/migration-detention-20120328.mp3 [hereinafter Holding Patterns] (discussing different definitions of detention).
26. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4.
27. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 9, at 4. This statistic
includes all categories of non-citizens, not just asylum-seekers. Id.
28. Fact Sheet: Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT [ICE], http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detentionmgmt.htm (last accessed June 22, 2012). ICE notes that these numbers do
not include counts for non-citizens detained with the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program or the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Id.
29. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 11. 11,244 people were granted affirmative
asylum in fiscal year 2010, with the highest percentage of those coming from
China. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 5. This follows a general decreasing trend
in grants of asylum over the past several years. Id.
30. H.R. REP. NO. 112-91, at 52 (2011); NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE
MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION
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amount of available bed space may affect the amount of time
an individual is detained.31 The average time of detention for
asylum-seekers is controversial; some experts say it ranges
from 47 to 109 days, while others indicate that it might be
much longer.32
Within the U.S. system, detention often consists of placement
in county jails or commercialized detention centers.33 While
this Note does not explore human rights violations or improvements extant within the detention system beyond its arbitrary or unnecessary overuse, it is worthy of mention that
extensive scholarship explores issues involving the general
criminalization of the civil immigration system;34 the effects of

DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2 (2012), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetent
ion.pdf.
31. Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars:
Advancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through
Human Rights Frameworks, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 157 (2008).
32. Renewing America’s Commitment to the Refugee Convention: The Refugee Protection Act of 2010: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement for the record from Physicians for Human Rights), available
at
http://rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/PHR%20Testimony,%205-19-10.pdf;
UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 12. The U.S. Supreme Court case
Zadvydas v. Davis, which declared detentions of more than six months to be
unreasonable and at odds with the U.S. Constitution, does not protect asylum-seekers because it only addressed the detention of those who were detained while awaiting deportation, as opposed to awaiting asylum proceedings. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
33. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Report on Immigration in the United States: Detention and Due
Process, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc.78/10, 85–87 (2010) [hereinafter IACHR]. As of
2009, approximately 50% of all detainees were held in county jails that also
contained prisoners. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 10.
With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial
and sentenced felons. ICE relies primarily on correctional incarceration standards designed for pre-trial felons and on correctional principles of care, custody, and control. These standards impose more restrictions and carry more costs than are necessary to effectively
manage the majority of the detained population.
Id. at 2–3.
34. See generally Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010). Criminal and immigrant populations in
detention are treated essentially the same. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4.
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family and child detention;35 and the lack of adequate medical
care,36 access to legal representation,37 and workable civil
standards for detention.38
B. The Process for Detaining Asylum-Seekers in the United
States
Currently, non-citizens entering the United States without
legally having gone through the proper immigration process in
advance are automatically placed in expedited removal proceedings unless they express their desire to apply for asylum to
an immigration officer.39 Once they do so, an immigration officer will detain the asylum-seeker pending the filing of their
asylum application and an interview with an asylum officer.40
From this point forward, the asylum-seeker is subject to mandatory detention, unless and until they can establish a basis for
discretionary parole or they are deported.41
After filing for asylum, the detainee proceeds to what is referred to as a “credible fear hearing” or “credible fear inter-

35. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 58-62.
36. See generally Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and
Mental Health Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the
United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 693 (2009).
37. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM–A TWO-YEAR REVIEW, 30 (2011) [hereinafter
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf.
38. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4 (“ICE adopted standards that are based
upon corrections law and promulgated by correctional organizations to guide
the operation of jails and prisons.”).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)(2012). Some exceptions do exist to bar an
arriving alien from applying for asylum in the United States. Notably, he or
she cannot have come from a safe third country where he or she could have
sought asylum; additionally, subject to extenuating circumstances, he or she
cannot have waited more than a year to apply for asylum after arriving in the
United States or have had a previous unsuccessful asylum application. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). While both are members of ICE, asylum
officers are distinct from immigration officers in that they have “professional
training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of [asylum] applications” and
that more experienced asylum officers supervise them. 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(E).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra
note 9, at 2. Parole will be discussed in more depth below.
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view,”42 which may take place up to forty-five days after the
filing of an application for asylum.43 At the hearing, one seeking asylum must establish to the satisfaction of an asylum officer that he or she has a “credible fear of persecution” in his or
her home country.44 This fear is defined as “a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements
made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and other such
facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish
eligibility for asylum” under existing U.S. law.45 At a credible
fear hearing, an ICE officer has the sole ability to determine if
the asylum-seeker has a credible fear that will likely support a
future favorable asylum ruling by an immigration judge.46 This
is the first, but not only, opportunity for individual discretion
or arbitrariness to seep into the asylum process.47 If the determination of the asylum officer is unfavorable, the asylumseeker will be slated for expedited removal “without further
hearing or review.”48 If favorable, the asylum officer will refer
the asylum-seeker for asylum adjudication in front of an immigration judge.49 By statute, the entire proceeding, excluding
appeal, should be concluded within 180 days, although the
42. E.g., Brané & Lunholm, supra note 31, at 150.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)(2012).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). Authority for asylum itself is based on 8
U.S.C. § 1158. The United States limits the available categories of persecution for which one can claim asylum to “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2012).
46. Gwynne Skinner, International Law Weekend 2009-I: Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the United States, 16
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 270, 275 n.18 (2008). Other than a
lack of credible fear, factors that might lead to rejection of a claim at this
point may include “committing certain crimes, posing a national security
threat, engaging in the persecution of others, or firmly resettling in another
country before coming to the United States.” MARTIN, supra note 15, at 4.
47. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that discretion leads
to arbitrariness). For a criticism of the United States’ ability to determine
credibility as being arbitrary in relation to refugee determinations, see Andrew F. Moore, Unsafe in America: A Review of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 237–238 (2007).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). If the asylum-seeker makes a “prompt”
request, he or she may have the decision reviewed by an immigration judge,
which by statute must happen no later than seven days after the negative
credible fear determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
49. Skinner, supra note 46, at 275.
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statute provides for the extension of this timeframe for “exceptional circumstances.”50
As noted, prior to being granted asylum by an immigration
judge, arriving asylum-seekers are subject to mandatory detention unless they can establish their basis for discretionary parole.51 This presumption in favor of detention is codified in 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which authorizes the Attorney General,
in his discretion[, to] parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a caseby-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United
States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as
an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of
any other applicant for admission to the United States.52

Thus, asylum-seekers will only be paroled if an individualized
case analysis reveals there is an “urgent humanitarian reason”
or “significant public benefit” for so doing. 53 This basis for parole has also been defined as applying to those classes of aliens
“whose continued detention is not in the public interest as determined by [ICE officials].”54 In a policy shift effective early
2010, ICE began to interpret parole in the “public interest” under this section to require “that the alien’s identity is sufficiently established, the alien poses neither a flight risk nor a danger
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii) (2012); Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Parole of Arriving
Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, at 2 (Dec. 8,
2009)
[hereinafter
Credible
Fear
Parole],
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hdparole_of_arriving_aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)(2012).
53. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5) (2012). Other classes enumerated under this section are more readily eligible for parole because they do not include a discretionary determination by an ICE official; these include individuals with serious medical conditions, pregnant women, juveniles, and those who are serving as witnesses in court proceedings. Id.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Credible Fear
Parole, supra note 51, at 2, 6–8.
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to the community, and no additional factors weigh against the
release of the alien.”55
While this development is a positive shift because it streamlined and increased the transparency of parole decisions, the
proof requirements remain an especially weighty burden for
asylum-seekers.56 Despite apparent sympathy to the circumstances of asylum-seekers, the policy emphasizes the discretionary nature of parole and requires the asylum-seeker to bear
the burden of demonstrating this information to the satisfaction of an ICE officer.57 The policy standards themselves recognize the inherent difficulties for asylum-seekers to provide adequate documentation or produce credible witnesses to corroborate their claims on asylum matters.58 These difficulties may
include a lack of travel documents, often associated with an
asylum-seeker’s unwillingness or inability to contact their for-

55. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6. In 2011, Morton issued an
additional directive, entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (“Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion”), which essentially incorporates the earlier memo and reiterates the
discretion of ICE officers to grant parole to an asylum-seeker under specific
circumstances. See Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6. ICE is
quick to add that the established policy creates no private cause of action.
Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 10.
56. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. The international community has
reviewed and commented on the general shift in ICE detention policy under
the Obama Administration. See, e.g., id. On the positive side, asylum-seekers
no longer have to file for parole; a parole meeting is automatic within seven
days of an asylum officer determining that the asylum-seeker has a credible
fear of persecution. Id. There are provisions to improve the transparency of
the process both through increased documentation and through informing
asylum-seekers about the process and their rights within it. Id. However,
there are criticisms in the international community that these changes do not
adequately address the problems for detainees, as they still bear a potentially
“insurmountable” burden of proof on the identity, flight risk, and security
issues. Id. Furthermore, because of the discretionary nature of the process,
there is great potential for arbitrary denials of parole, and thus arbitrary
detention; this arbitrariness is especially obvious when considering regional
disparities in parole denials. Id. Additionally, negative parole determinations
remain reviewable only at the discretion of an ICE officer, which enforces the
officer’s role as both “judge and jailer.” IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. See
also Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. For the policy itself, see Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6.
57. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8.
58. Id.

462

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:1

mer government, or a lack of ties to any community within the
United States as a result of their recent urgent arrival.59 Asylum-seekers are additionally prejudiced because, by virtue of
their situation, any attempt to meet this proof requirement to
gain parole must be done while in detention.60 Moreover, the
same set of challenges, particularly the notion that “detention
will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity to present his or her [case] or to have the assistance of counsel,”61
limit the asylum-seeker’s ability to successfully obtain parole.62
Furthermore, because the policy standards are non-binding,
they can be changed at any time and thus do not provide any
lasting guarantees even for the opportunity of parole.63 As a
result, the system remains weighted in favor of continued detention.64
C. How the U.S. Detention System Violates International Human Rights Laws and Norms
Numerous legal scholars and advocacy groups have argued
that the U.S. detention policy—featuring a presumption in fa-

59. Id.
60. Mark L. Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to
Appointed Counsel for Manditorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing how detention leads to “cascading deprivations” of rights of those detained—for example, the difficulties in obtaining counsel from detention may lead to higher
rates of unsuccessful cases and time wasted arguing over appointed counsel
for detainees); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 185, 223 (Erika Feller et al.
eds., 2003) (“Detention will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity
to present his or her case.”); SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 50 (“social isolation is a significant issue for most detainees.”). The parole determination
“typically occurs within three weeks of apprehension.” UNLOCKING LIBERTY,
supra note 20, at 20.
61. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223. See also, Noferi, supra note 60, at
25–26 (“The difficulty of challenging an immigration detention and case while
detained is compounded by the inability of most detainees to secure counsel—
or, indeed, any adequate source of legal assistance.”).
62. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223; Noferi, supra note 60, at 25–
26.
63. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51.
64. See Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8. See also IACHR, supra
note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51.
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vor of detention—violates international obligations.65 Various
treaties and conventions articulate an aversion to immigration
detention in the vast majority of circumstances, finding it to be
violative of human rights principles.66 This includes the more
specific rules regarding asylum-seekers who declare their desire to seek asylum once they are within the country to which
they fled.67 “In most cases, only if an individual’s claim to refugee status is examined before he or she is affected by an exercise of State jurisdiction . . . can the State be sure that its international obligations are met.”68 This pre-approval, however,
may prove challenging for asylum-seekers to attain given that
the persecution many of them are fleeing might not provide the
time or opportunity to plan ahead and apply for protection in
another country before leaving their home country.69
The United States is not a party to all of such conventions or
treaties,70 although it is arguably bound under customary international laws71 or norms to abide by them anyway.72 Codifi-

65. E.g., SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA, supra note 16, at 31–
32; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, 5–6; Brané & Lundholm, supra note
31.
66. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (against
arbitrary detention of all people); Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 9, 12 [hereinafter
ICCPR] (against arbitrary and unnecessary detention).
67. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 66; Refugee Convention, supra note 15;
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; ICCPR, supra note 66, arts. 9,
12.
68. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 187 (emphasis in original). Here “State
jurisdiction” indicates the country to which the asylum-seeker fled. See id.
69. See, e.g., Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (recognizing that
arriving aliens might not have travel documents because of flight).
70. For example, the United States “remains the only state, other than
Somalia, which has not ratified the [Convention on the Rights of the Child],”
a convention essential for guaranteeing rights of children and families in asylum and other contexts. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 153.
71. Customary international law is “international law that derives from
the practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding. This is one
of the principal sources or building blocks of the international legal system.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (9th ed. 2009).
72. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111(1) (1987) (“International law and international agreements of the United States are law of
the United States and supreme over the law of the several States.”). See also
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cation of customary international law declares that a country
“violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention.”73 Admittedly, some international laws or norms have
exigency exceptions that allow states to detain aliens in cases
of “necessity.”74 However, as most of those detained do not present any risks to the State from which they are seeking aid,
these exigency exceptions do not justify the categorical detention of all asylum-seekers.75
There are multiple international treaties that protect the
rights of people seeking asylum, and many have prohibitions
against “arbitrary” detention, “unnecessary” detention, or
both.76 Beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”), the international community has recognized
“the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.”77 Furthermore, the UDHR established that “no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”78
While establishing these rights that would come to form the
basis of international human rights law, the drafters of the
UDHR did not define many of the terms they used, including
“arbitrary.”79
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“1951 Convention”) expanded upon the UDHR by creating a
multilateral treaty wherein “the contracting states shall not
apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of
our law.”).
73. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 702(e) (1987).
74. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); Goodwin-Gill,
supra note 60, at 232.
75. See Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[L]ess than ten percent of asylum applicants . . . disappear when they are released to proper supervision
and facilities.”).
76. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 9 (against arbitrary detention); Refugee
Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15;
ICCPR, supra note 66, at arts. 9, 12 (against arbitrary and unnecessary detention). The two terms are interrelated, as detaining unnecessarily can constitute arbitrariness. See, e.g. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157.
77. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III).
78. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added).
79. See UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III) (not defining terms used); The
Foundation
of
International
Human
Rights
Law,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last accessed June 22,
2012) (UDHR as basis for field of international human rights law).
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than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only
be applied until their status in the country is regularized or
they obtain admission into another country.”80 While detention
for identity verification, public safety, and national security
have been given as examples of detention that could potentially
be considered “necessary,” and therefore permissible under the
1951 Convention, some scholars have interpreted detention
subsequent to these conditions to be only for extraordinary circumstances.81 While the United States did not sign the 1951
Convention, it did ratify the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention that incorporated and modernized the Convention, thereby
binding the United States to those international obligations.82
In addition to the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol restrictions
against unnecessary detention, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) prohibits detention from being “arbitrary.”83 Under Article 9 of the ICCPR, arbitrary detention, though not precisely defined, is expressly
prohibited.84 Article 9 further holds speedy access to a court
proceeding to be essential for anyone “deprived of his liberty by
. . . detention.”85
Because much of the language in these treaties is vague or
undefined, the international community seeks guidance from
both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) and the Executive Committee of the UNHCR (“Ex-

80. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2) (emphasis added).
81. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 232.
82. Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention,
supra note 15. The United States signed the 1967 Protocol without any reservations, understandings, or declarations (“RUDs”) relevant to this analysis.
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15.
83. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1). The United States ratified the ICCPR
in 1992, attaching RUDs that limit some provisions, but none specifically
relevant to this analysis. Id. The United States declared the Convention to be
non-self-executing, or incapable of taking effect without implementing legislation. Id; Kessler, supra note 3, at 577; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining self-executing).
84. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1); Kessler, supra note 3, at 580 (“In the
context of Article 9(1), [arbitrary] encompasses not just unlawful detentions,
but also all those that are unjust, unpredictable, unreasonable, capricious,
and disproportional.”).
85. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(4).
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Com”) in interpreting its obligations to refugees.86 The ExCom
has stated that
[W]ide discretionary powers [to detain] . . . are far too frequently applied in an arbitrary manner. For instance, a large
number of asylum-seekers are detained on the formal basis
that it is likely that they will abscond . . . international
standards dictate that there must be some substantive basis
for such a conclusion in the individual case.87

The specious justification of needing to prove an asylumseeker’s identity is yet another example of arbitrariness in the
detention process.88 Proving identity “should not routinely be
judged necessary” in light of the circumstances which lead asylum-seekers to flee persecution in the first place.89 The ExCom
guidelines emphasize that implementing individualized,
“prompt, mandatory and periodic review of all detention orders
before an independent and impartial body” of the destinationstate’s need to detain is fundamental to avoiding arbitrary detention.90 Furthermore, the UNHCR has continually advocated
for a presumption against detention.91
Scholars have additionally argued that arbitrary detention
exists where there is “inappropriateness, injustice, and lack of
predictability” in the detention process.92 “Arbitrary detention
occurs when refugee applicants are detained on the basis of
broad criteria that do not allow for individualized determina86. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 n.22 (1987). The
United States Supreme Court has held that at least one set of guidelines established by the UNHCR is helpful in interpreting 1967 Protocol obligations.
Id. In discussing the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status, written by the UNHCR, the Court said, “the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress
sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to
the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” Id. The Court noted that the
guidance, while helpful, was non-binding. Id. See also, Skinner, supra note
46, at 278–79.
87. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3–4.
91. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 20, at 3; UNHCR, Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, U.N. Doc. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986 (Oct. 13, 1986); ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 1.
92. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 156–57 (quoting GUY GOODWINGILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (2d ed. 1996)).
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tions of the need for detention, when there is no administrative
or judicial review, or when detention occurs for disproportionate or extended periods.”93
U.S. practices are arbitrary because detention is applied as a
“blanket policy;” chances for parole—varying “anywhere from
0.5% to 98%”—are inconsistent;94 judicial review, in practice, is
either unavailable or limited by judges citing a lack of jurisdiction; and because compliance rates are quite high, further supporting “the argument that the detention of asylum seekers is
arbitrary because it is unnecessary.”95 Moreover, there is evidence to suggest arbitrariness in parole decisions, as some
watchdog groups have found that the choice to parole an asylum-seeker can sometimes be made based on available bed
space in detention centers rather than the merits of an individual’s claim for release.96 As put forth in the Restatement Third,
“[A] single, brief, arbitrary detention by an official of a state
party to one of the principal international agreements might
violate that agreement; arbitrary detention violates customary
law if it is prolonged and practiced as state policy.”97 This
weighs against the United States’ categorical detention of all
asylum-seekers because, without sufficient individualized assessment, there is no way to ensure detention is necessary.98
Additionally, because the U.S. policy leaves determinations of
credible fear and parole to the discretion of individual ICE officers, any localized breach or non-compliance can result in international law violations.99
The international community has noticed the United States’
violations of international law.100 Following his May 2007 visit,
the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants expressed his “serious concern” with the status of the U.S. deten93. Moore, supra note 47, at 267.
94. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157 (“[Parole policy] seems to
depend more upon the personality of the district director and the available
bed space than it does upon a reasoned policy of release criteria.”).
95. Id.
96. Moore, supra note 47, at 263, 269.
97. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 cmt. h (1987).
98. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 219.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants, Mission to
the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2008) (by
Jorge Bustamante) [hereinafter Mission to the United States]; IACHR, supra
note 33, at 144.
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tion system.101 The Special Rapporteur “[came] to the conclusion that the United States ha[d] failed to adhere to its international obligations to make the human rights of the 37.5 million migrants living in the country . . . a national priority, using
a comprehensive and coordinated national policy based on clear
international obligations.”102 His report went on to discuss the
various violations of international law within the United
States103 and made recommendations for improvement that included the complete elimination of mandatory detention.104
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
produced in 2011 a comprehensive report on the U.S. immigration and detention system.105 Along with urging the United
States to “comply fully with the international human rights obligations under the American Declaration [of the Rights and
Duties of Man],”106 the Commission advocated for the country’s
discontinuation of mandatory detention practices.107
II. DISASSOCIATING FROM PRESUMPTIONS THAT FAVOR
DETENTION
In order to become compliant with international law, the U.S.
detention practices for refugees and asylum-seekers need to
align more closely with the protection-based mandates of the
aforementioned provisions that proscribe detention from being
either arbitrary or unnecessary.108 To do this, the United States
needs to utilize risk-analysis and ATDs to release or parole detainees held without legitimate justification.109 However, no
alternative program can be successful until the U.S. immigration system shifts its application of immigration statutes from
101. Mission to the United States, supra note 100, at 2.
102. Id. at 3.
103. See generally id.
104. Id. at 24.
105. IACHR, supra note 33.
106. Id. at 155. In its reply to the draft version of the report, the United
States was quick to point out that the American Declaration is “a nonbinding
instrument that does not itself create legal rights or impose legal obligations
on signatory states.” Id. at 7. The IACHR countered that the Declaration does
create obligations for member and non-member states alike under the charter
of the Organization of American States, the American regional counterpart to
the United Nations, of which the United States is a member. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 147.
108. See Part I.B., supra.
109. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, supra note 20, at 16.
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the categorical mandatory detention of asylum-seekers to a
more flexible system where detention is used only as a last resort.110 Many asylum experts have advocated for this and have
created programs based on the “presumption against detention” model.111 To understand how, by following suit, the United States could avoid arbitrary or unnecessary detention, it is
first helpful to recognize the rationales it puts forth for using a
mandatory detention policy in the first place.112 Section A
enunciates what risks the United States assumes when, rather
than detain, it releases asylum-seekers into an ATD program
and, by extension, the community. Sections B and C seek to
understand the potential benefits of effectively implemented
risk analysis and ATD programs as compared to those currently in operation within the U.S. system.
A. Detention Rationales
Countries often cite the inherent risks associated with admitting aliens as a rationale for detaining them.113 As discussed in
Part I.B, the current U.S. detention policy centers on these
risks by presuming detention for aliens unless they are able to
establish: 1) their identity, 2) that they are not a flight risk
and, 3) that they are not a danger to society; or they must establish they have an additional extenuating circumstance that
justifies their release.114 By exploring the scope of these inherent risks, the United States can better address any actual risks
and ultimately eliminate the use of detention that is excessive
in matching the scope of that risk.115
The United States justifies detention—at least until there is
satisfactory proof of the asylum-seeker’s identity—by citing the
need to ensure that the alien will comply with specific proceedings, including meeting attendance, hearings, and, potentially,

110. See, e.g., JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 37, at 42.
111. See, e.g., SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20.
112. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 149–52 (exploring detention
rationales).
113. See id.
114. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 2–3, 6–8. Extenuating circumstances include serious medical conditions, pregnancy, juvenile status, and
aliens slated to serve as witnesses. 8 C.F.R § 212.5(b); Credible Fear Parole,
supra note 51, at 2.
115. See Brané, supra note 31, at 149–52.
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removal.116 The United States has declared, “asylum-related
fraud is of genuine concern”117 and also wants to be certain before paroling an asylum-seeker that the person is not threatening to the community or the nation as a whole.118 Further, the
current policy indicates that detention will continue if there are
“serious adverse foreign policy consequences that may result if
the alien is released or [if there are] overriding law enforcement interests.”119 Moreover, the U.S. immigration system is
bogged down120 and the caseload in immigration courts is high,
increasing the time that asylum-seekers in detention must wait
for their case to be heard.121
Yet if the U.S. method of detention is meant to serve as a deterrence to emigration, the strategy itself would violate international laws.122 Regardless of a host country’s detention policies, asylum-seekers will always impose some level of risk to
that country.123 Thus, to argue that U.S. asylum detention is an

116. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (“likelihood of appearing
when required”) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Michael Matza, Immigration Cases Clogging Federal Courts,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 18, 2011, at A2 (“Despite the nationwide hiring of more
than 40 additional [immigration court] judges in the past year, the number of
deportation cases, asylum claims, and green-card fraud prosecutions … is at
an all time high: 275,000 and climbing.”); Dan Moffett, Conveyor Belt to Deportation: Asylum Cases don’t get Attention they Deserve, PALM BEACH POST,
Feb. 16, 2010, at A14 (“the system is choked by an exploding caseload and an
exponential increase in outside pressures…the backlog has gotten progressively worse in the last decade.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Walker, Enhancing Quality
and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication, Report for the Administrative Conference for the United States, June 7, 2012, 40–42, available at
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/EnhancingQuality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June72012.pdf (suggesting that defensive asylum cases should be heard by asylum
officers like affirmative cases are, rather than immigration judges, in order to
speed the process).
122. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, at art. 31(2); Protocol to Refugee
Convention, supra note 15 (incorporating the articles of the Refugee Convention); See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 228 (noting the fear that
deterrence is the true rationale behind U.S. detention and parole policies).
123. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 1. “Any reduction in global asylum
numbers have been associated with non-entrée policies, including contain-
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effective deterrence factor is to ignore the reason that people
are seeking asylum in the first place: they consider the situation they are fleeing to be worse.124 Risk-analysis tools and
ATDs can work together to ameliorate the concerns that justify
detention, and reduce the burden on the U.S. immigration system, by allowing for the parole of more asylum-seekers.125
B. The Importance of Risk-Analysis
To address these limited, but admittedly legitimate, fears
and still comply with international obligations, the United
States needs to assess the level of risk that asylum-seekers
pose on an individual level, regarding both danger to society
and risk of flight.126 Risk-analysis tools fill the gap between
categorical detention and ATDs by ensuring that any method
used for a person is necessary and not arbitrary, thus complying with international treaties.127 Detention can be legitimate
under international law only when an individualized assessment establishes that there is no lesser method that the government can take to mitigate the dangers posed by that particular non-citizen.128 This is because
international human rights law requires that detention decisions be made on a case-by-case basis after an individualized
assessment of the functional and legitimate need of detaining
a particular individual, the understanding that anyone deprived of liberty is entitled to judicial review of this decision,

ment in regions of origin and interception/interdiction measures, or can be
attributed to large-scale repatriation programmes.” Id. at 1 n.4.
124. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]hreats to life or freedom in
countries of origin are likely to be a greater push factor than any disincentive
created by detention policies in countries of destination.”). “The principal aim
of asylum seekers and refugees is to reach a place of safety . . . those who are
aware of the prospect of detention before arrival believe it is an unavoidable
part of the journey, that they will still be treated humanely despite being
detained.” SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 11.
125. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22.
126. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 17, 20. While this Note focuses on riskanalysis as the capacity to reduce threats posed to the community, the assessments can also include screening for special vulnerabilities present in the
individual that require attention. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22.
127. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15.
128. See, e.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that arbitrariness results unless there is an individualized determination that a person is
likely to abscond).
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and that any restriction of liberty should be the least restrictive means necessary.129

An appropriate risk assessment tool would allow the United
States to screen for the identified threats posed by non-citizens
entering the country—lack of identity, risk of flight, and risk of
danger—in order to make decisions about the level of supervision and support necessary to ensure compliance with the system.130 Such a tool could allow the United States to increase
legitimacy within the system through increased compliance
while reducing detention costs in favor of less-costly ATDs.131
One criticism of the efficacy of any risk-assessment procedure
is that there is a general absence of data at either the national
or the international level regarding the success or failure of
asylum-seekers to comply with proceedings or mandates.132
“The scarcity of governmental statistics with regard to those
who abscond [or fail to comply with a removal order] severely
weakens the empirical evaluation of one form of conditional release in comparison to another.”133 One way to ensure that asylum-seekers are paroled or, if detained, that detention is in the
least restrictive manner, is to increase predictability of asylumseekers absconding by improving data collection via risk assessments.134
An interesting parallel can be drawn to recent risk and data
collection paradigms the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(“CBP”) has utilized, in the context of national security, regarding the flow of people and goods through U.S. borders.135 In response to increasing terror threats against the United States,
CBP has utilized improved data analysis to distinguish be129. Id.
130. See SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22 (“[A]ssessment enables authorities
to make an informed decision about the most appropriate way to manage and
support the individual as they seek to resolve their migration status and to
make case-by-case decisions about the need to detain or not.”).
131. See Unlocking Liberty, supra note 20, at 41–42 (identifying the shortcomings of “standard risk assessment” as opposed to individualized risk assessment).
132. See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 24–25.
133. Id. at 25.
134. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 18–19.
135. See generally CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, CBP Launches Centers to
Facilitate Processing of Imports, October 20, 2011, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/2011_news_arc
hive/10202011_2.xml.
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tween safe and unsafe traffic, goods, and passengers.136 Speeding up the screening process for safe traffic actually increased
CBP’s ability to focus resources on who or what was a true
threat.137 Essential to speeding up safe traffic is the sharing of
information not only within an organization but also between
an organization and “safe” civilians, across multiple agencies,
and among nations.138 CBP’s efforts provide a model for the
way that ICE can speed up the parole of safe detainees in order
to better focus on those that are unsafe.139 Based on CBP’s
model, the United States might be able to speed asylumseekers into parole or ATDs in a number of ways, such as having ICE offices become more efficient at reporting factors contributing to or detracting from compliance; requiring ICE and
NGOs to compile data on asylum-seekers’ compliance; or by
sharing statistics with Canada and Mexico relating to risks
posed by asylum-seekers and ultimate compliance.140 The expedited process could have similar benefits as those seen by
CBP—the ability to focus finances and personnel on true
136. Alan D. Bersin, Lecture, Lines and Flows: The Beginning and End of
Borders 12, Ira M. Belfer Lecture, Brooklyn Law School (Oct. 6, 2011).
137. Bersin, supra note 136. See also, UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at
41 (“Using individualized custody determinations could improve efficiency by
maintaining the detention levels necessary and diverting those resources to
more appropriate means of ensuring that immigrants report for immigration
proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
138. Bersin, supra note 136, at 9–11.
139. Bersin, supra note 136. See generally U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION [CBP], OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, NATIONAL BORDER PATROL
STRATEGY
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_pa
trol_ohs/national_bp_strategy.ctt/national_bp_strategy.pdf. For example, the
Northern Border Project has the goal of developing technology along the
U.S./Canada border to better address the challenges of protecting that border. It includes testing an “Apex-Secure Transit Corridor” wherein members
of the transit industry use government-approved technology when crossing
the border to streamline the security screening process. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY [DHS], CBP, NORTHERN BORDER DIVISION FACT SHEET,
available
at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/border/secure_bor
der/northern_border_fs.ctt/northern_border_fs.pdf (Last accessed Sept. 17,
2012).
140. Compare id. See also, Holding Patterns, supra note 25, at 28:30–30:18
(discussing frustration at how detention issues become localized despite the
fact that many countries face them, but how governments are beginning to
work together).
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threats—while also avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary detention by releasing individuals who qualify into ATDs.141 To ensure that the process does not become discriminatory or too bureaucratic, expert input, trained staff, specific guidelines, and
formal review should be a part of any new data analysis process.142
While overriding long-standing aversions to sharing between
countries could be a challenge at any level of cooperation, the
benefits of increased data sharing and analysis in this digitized, information-driven society outweigh the drawbacks.143
Data regarding compliance on a national or international level
could influence detention planning on the whole and decisions
made in individual cases in the same way data from pilot programs have already shaped decisions on a smaller scale.144 Ultimately, by “designing effective alternatives to detention and
knowing when they can and should be relied upon to work,”
risk analysis, supplemented by data collection, can help to reduce unnecessary and arbitrary detention.145
C. Why Alternatives to Detention are Important
In the spectrum between full detention and unrestrained liberty, ATDs occupy any method that is not at either extreme.146
These methods include, from the most to the least restrictive:
in-home detention and electronic monitoring; supervision or
reporting; residency restrictions; release to community supervision; release on bail, bond, or surety; and documentation.147 It
is important to note, however, that just because a given method
has been classified as an ATD does not mean it necessarily

141. See Bersin, supra note 138. See also, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note
35, at 29 (“if the data used during risk assessment is linked appropriately to
a centralized database . . . the tool may provide much-needed information
about release processes and classification decisions at all facilities in the detention system, improving the potential for oversight and accountability.”).
142. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 18–21; Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 81.
143. Bersin, supra note 138, at 9–11. Bersin noted that U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol operates the “U.S. government’s largest collection, storage and
dissemination functions with respect to unclassified data.” Id. at 10.
144. See VERA, supra note 16, at iii; Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11,
at 24–25.
145. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 25.
146. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 8–9.
147. Id. at 53.
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complies with international law.148 The intensity of a given
ATD method varies, but in order to avoid violating international legal mandates it should comport with the level of risk established via risk-analysis on a case-by-case basis.149 Because of
this, asylum-seekers already eligible for parole without restrictions should not be placed in ATD programs that are more
restrictive than parole as doing so would result in more restrictions on liberty than necessary.150 ATDs should be utilized
for those asylum-seekers who do not require more restrictive
deprivations of liberty, such as detention, and not as a substitute for lesser restrictions like release on parole.151
Many ATD methods, if implemented properly, could allow the
United States to harmonize the delicate balance between the
systemic risks that lead to over-detention and the international
human rights laws that only authorize detention as a last resort.152 This is because many ATDs occupy a middle ground,
addressing the risks that detention is intended to prevent
while allowing the asylum-seeker to be free from unnecessary
or arbitrary detention.153 Some programs utilize residency restrictions in a variety of ways, including “open centers, semiopen centers, [or] directed residence” that often allow the asylum-seeker to be released into the community with varying levels of supervision.154 The most successful ATD programs utilize
a combination of ATD methods designed to meet the needs and
risks of individual asylum-seekers.155
Yet even some ATD programs can violate international law;
methods such as home detention and electronic tagging are
“very intensive” methods in relation to the restrictions they
place on liberty and can rise to the level of detention despite
technical release.156 It is possible that even allowing for release
148. Id. at 9.
149. Compare SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22 with Part I.C., supra.
150. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 39.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., SAMPSON, supra note 20 (presenting the “Community Assessment and Placement model,” which blends risk analysis and ATDs to meet
humanitarian standards).
153. Sampson, supra note 20, at 53.
154. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 30–35.
155. See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 20, at 22.
156. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38–39; Holding Patterns, supra
note 25, at 36:36–38:40 (stating that these intensive methods should be a last
resort).
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on bail, bond, or surety—often considered less restrictive and
typically involving no more restrictions on liberty than a financial or vouch-person guarantee—may violate international law
where asylum-seekers remain unnecessarily detained simply
because they have little access to funds or community sponsors,
and not because they pose a threat.157 As such, implementing
these methods alone may not bring the United States into compliance with international law.158
One example of a successful NGO pilot ATD program is the
community supervision experiment titled “Appearance Assistance Program” (“AAP”), developed and tested in the late 1990s
by the Vera Institute of Justice at the request of then-extant
INS.159 The program provided for asylum-seekers classified in
its “intensive” track160 to be released from detention to the supervision of AAP staff.161 The supervision included monthly
monitoring and reporting requirements—both in person and
via phone—and repeated flight-risk evaluations.162 AAP also
offered support to asylum-seekers by giving information about
obligations, hearing dates, the legal process, and the available
services within the community.163 By utilizing strategic intake
interviews and supervision that had the potential to alert AAP
staff of participant non-compliance or the threat thereof, AAP
staff were able to recommend decreased, constant, or increased
supervision, or even redetention if necessary.164 Not only did
asylum-seeker participants have high appearance rates at
court dates165—93%—thereby addressing the risks used to jus-

157. See, Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 54–55; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38–39.
158. See, UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38. See also, Part I.C., supra.
159. VERA, supra note 16. The program divided non-citizens in the program
into three groups. Id. at 1. Only the findings relating to the asylum-seeker
group will be discussed in this Note.
160. The program also operated a low-intensity “regular” track, not the subject of this inquiry, wherein participants voluntarily enrolled in the program
after being released on parole by INS. VERA, supra note 16, at 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 13–17.
165. The high appearance rates are as compared with appearance rates of
78% for asylum-seekers that were members of the control group, on parole
but not participating in AAP. Id. at 27.
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tify categorical detention,166 but the program also reduced unnecessary detention by presuming release and only redetaining
those who violated the conditions of release or who truly were a
flight risk.167
III. IMMIGRATION, DETENTION, AND PATH DEPENDENCY
Despite the expansive reach of ICE and DHS detention powers, the United States is on the edge of immigration reforms
that have the potential to change the face of the immigration
system and could bring the country within the standards mandated by international laws.168 The Obama Administration began to discuss an overhaul of the immigration detention system
in response to an unfavorable report by a DHS consultant.169
Since then, a series of developments has energized the reform
advocates seeking to alter the status quo of immigration and
detention in the United States.170 Attorney General Eric Holder
made a 2011 announcement (“PD Memo”) that granted discretion to ICE officers to decline prosecution or detention in a
number of situations, including those pertaining to asylumseekers.171 Additionally, in late 2011, DHS began a review of
300,000 immigration cases with the aim of implementing the
PD Memo and allowing the department to focus its limited resources on “deporting foreigners who committed serious crimes
or pose national security risks.”172 Furthermore, ICE has recently developed and begun testing a risk assessment tool to be
used in determining parole-eligibility for detainees, slated for

166. See Part II.A., supra.
167. VERA, supra note 16, at 16–17.
168. See generally, THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17; Detention Reform Accomplishments, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT [ICE],
http://www.ice.gov/detention-reform/detention-reform.htm
(last
accessed
June 24, 2012) [hereinafter Detention Reform Accomplishments].
169. SCHRIRO, supra note 18; Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra
note 170.
170. See Robert Pear, Fewer Youths to Be Deported in New Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1; Preston, supra note 7; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ICE Parole Guideline is an Important First Step to Fix
Flawed Treatment of Asylum Seekers in the United States, (Dec. 23, 2009),
available at http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/2891.html.
171. Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6.
172. Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2011, at A1; Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6.
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nationwide implementation in 2012.173 The United States has
also consolidated multiple former ATD programs into one – the
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (“ISAP II”) – and
executed a contract with a private company to administer it.174
Finally, several senators introduced a bill during the 112th session to enact “comprehensive immigration reform” which includes provisions for the protection of asylum-seekers.175
The importance of this reform momentum can be illustrated
by the theory of path dependency, first popularized by economist Paul David in the mid-eighties, wherein “individual decision[-]making early on in the path may lead to a ‘lock-in’ of a
pattern that is collectively suboptimal.”176 To illustrate the theory, David examined the series of decisions made by individual
business owners and individual typists to buy and be trained
on QWERTY keyboard models. The purchase of these keyboards led to the “lock-in”, or enduring prominence, of the
suboptimal keyboard configuration long after the technology
that required said layout had been phased out.177 The lock-in of
a given method creates “the very heavy disincentives that face
those who would wish to depart significantly from that which
has gone before,” and acts to reinforce the existing situation.178
It is significantly more difficult to alter the course after the
method becomes “locked-in” because of the “technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility of investment” that lead to the method becoming entrenched despite other, better, methods being available.179
173. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
174. Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra note 170; UNLOCKING
LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 31–32.
175. S. 1258, 112th Cong. (2011).
176. David Wilsford, Path Dependency, or Why History Makes it Difficult
but Not Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way, 14 J. PUB.
POLICY 251, 252 (Jul.–Dec. 1994).
177. David, supra note 23. David declared the configuration suboptimal
because winning speed-typists typically utilized a Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (“DSK”) layout and because a U.S. Naval study revealed that the cost
of retraining typists to use the DSK layout could be recouped within ten days
due to the increased efficiency of the typists on that keyboard. Id. at 332. By
the time the technological limitation that required the QWERTY configuration – jamming typebars – was obsolete, the configuration was already
locked-in. Id. at 333–34.
178. Wilsford, supra note 178, at 253–54.
179. David, supra note 23, at 334. In the QWERTY example, David describes “technical interrelatedness” as the positive feedback loop between
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The U.S. detention of asylum-seekers is similar to the
QWERTY conundrum.180 The prominence of the presumption in
favor of detention can be, in part, explained by the positive
feedback loop between the public and political responses to terrorism.181 Decisions made in response to terrorism have contributed to the prominence of mandatory detention for asylumseekers, at least until they can prove they are not a risk.182
Now it is clear that categorical mandatory detention is suboptimal, as it violates international laws.183 Despite being obsolete, the presumption in favor of detention might now be
locked-in because it is easier to continue using it than to alter
infrastructure and training to facilitate eliminating it.184

individuals choosing to learn QWERTY typing because business owners seek
to hire QWERTY-trained typists and business owners purchasing QWERTY
machines and thus seeking to hire QWERTY-trained typists. Id. at 334–35.
“Economies of scale” are represented by the decrease in “user costs of a typewriting system based upon QWERTY . . . as it gained acceptance relative to
other systems.” Id. at 335. David illustrates the “quasi-irreversibility of investments” as the point in development when QWERTY keyboards became
“locked-in” because “it became privately profitable [for non-QWERTY manufacturers] in the short run to adapt machines to the habits of men…rather
than the other way around.” Id.
180. See generally, id.
181. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2002)
(establishing DHS, changing the INS to ICE, and mainly focusing its mission
statement on the prevention of terrorist attacks through securing the homeland); Alison Mitchell & Todd S. Purdum, A Nation Challenged: The Lawmakers; Ashcroft, Seeking Broad Powers, Says Congress Must Act Quickly, N.
Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at A1 (indicating lawmakers urged strict immigration
control in response to national security concerns after 9/11, but that the momentum for control began after the 1993 World Trade Center bombings);
McFadden, supra note 8, at B4 (“[M]ost New Yorkers think illegal immigrants pose a serious threat of terrorism and believe that the [1993 World
Trade Center] bombing would not have occurred if immigration controls had
been tighter.”); Brané, supra note 31, at 150–151 (discussing security as a
common reason that countries might choose to detain). See generally, David,
supra note 23.
182. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2002)
(establishing DHS and ICE); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 302, Pub.L. 104-208 Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(1996) (creating mandatory detention for some classes of non-citizens). See
generally, David, supra note 23.
183. See Part I.C., supra; See generally, David, supra note 23.
184. See generally, David, supra note 23. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note 6, with Preston, supra note 7.
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Digressing from the path is not impossible.185 Radical deviations from the status quo become more likely when institutional frameworks that keep to the current path, like ICE policies
in favor of detention, meet with unpredictable external forces,
like the current momentum for U.S. immigration and detention
reform.186 Like political reform momentum, external forces in
the path dependency context are “fleeting comings together of a
number of diverse elements into a new, single combination.”187
Because of this, U.S. immigration and detention reform is at a
critical juncture where immense change is possible.188 It is essential that the United States capitalize on this opportunity
and reform in a way that brings its practice into compliance
with international law standards as this moment is fleeting
and changes in the elements, such as the inauguration of a new
political party into power, could close the window of opportunity.189 In addition to haste, it is imperative to alter the status
quo in a way that does actually bring the United States within
international law mandates because anything else could potentially lock-in a new, equally suboptimal method.190
IV. IGNORING RECOMMENDATIONS OF ASYLUM EXPERTS LEADS
TO INEFFICIENT REFORMS IN THE ASYLUM DETENTION SYSTEM
Rather than taking full advantage of the opportunity to bring
its immigration and detention system into compliance with international human rights law, the United States has constructively ignored the recommendations of asylum experts and,
thus, recent efforts at progress have failed to amount to any
significant decrease in unnecessary or arbitrary detention.191 In
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

David, supra note 23, at 334.
Wilsford, supra note 178, at 270.
Id. at 256–58, 270.
See generally, id.
See, id. at 254.
See, David, supra note 23, at 336, stating

Despite the presence of the sort of externalities that standard static
analysis tells us would interfere with the achievement of the socially
optimal degree of system compatibility, competition in the absence of
perfect futures markets drove the industry prematurely into standardization on the wrong system – where decentralized decision making subsequently has sufficed to hold it. (emphasis in original).
191. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Preston, supra note 7.
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some instances NGOs have achieved high success rates in designing and piloting programs that implement their recommendations for risk analysis and ATDs.192 However, as this
Part will illustrate, the United States has repeatedly decided
against implementing their recommendations and has instead
moved toward a suboptimal path in which reformed programs
continue to violate international obligations.193
A. The United States Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal RiskAnalysis
When ICE, DHS, and the Obama Administration pledged an
overhaul of the U.S. immigration and detention system, they
identified the need for a risk assessment mechanism that
would facilitate non-citizens in being either paroled or enrolled
into ATD programs.194 At the beginning of 2010, ICE worked
with various NGOs, led by the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (“LIRS”), to develop this “risk assessment tool.”195
The exact details of this tool have not been made public.196
However, both LIRS and Human Rights First indicated that
ICE’s tool is designed to use “objective criteria to guide decision-making regarding whether or not an alien should be detained or released; the alien’s custody classification level, if detained; and the alien’s level of community supervision (to include an ICE ATD program), if released.”197 LIRS noted that
the tool “includes mathematically weighted factors that should
signal the likelihood of threat to the community based on past

192. See, e.g., UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at appendices B, C, D,
54–61; VERA, supra note 16.
193. See, e.g., UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 29.
194. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 17, 20. While ICE does have a system in
place that “classifies detainees as low, moderate, or high custody[, t]he primary basis for classification is criminal history[,]” and its purpose is to aid in
housing already detained aliens and not for risk analysis associated with parole. Id. at 17.
195. Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra note 170; UNLOCKING
LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
196. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
197. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 20; JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra
note 35, at 29. While LIRS did not indicate where they received the information, Human Rights First quoted email correspondence between their office and ICE officials, dated October 1, 2011. Id.
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behavior as well as of absconding for each and every individual
ICE apprehends.”198
The tool, slated for nationwide implementation in 2012, has
already garnered criticism from those to whom ICE has granted advanced exposure.199 In reviewing a pilot version, the
UNHCR expressed concern that the “tool, based on a mathematical calculation, risks becoming a bureaucratic, tick-box exercise and may lead only to artificial individual assessments
rather than real ones. It also appears heavily weighted in favour of detention.”200 Based on these assessments, it seems that
this aspect of ICE’s tool could become arbitrary and thus would
not satisfy international obligations.201 The continued presumption for detention also violates the guidance for implementing the policies advocated in the UDHR, 1951 Convention,
1967 Protocol, and ICCPR.202
Furthermore, although designed subsequent to ICE consultations with NGOs specializing in asylee and refugee protection,203 the tool apparently falls short of asylum experts’ recommendations.204 LIRS, after providing support to ICE in the
development stages of the tool, found it contains a “total absence of individualized assessment of risk for people subject to
mandatory detention. There is also no standard assessment of
risk with judicial review for people eligible for parole, such as
arriving asylum-seekers who are found to have a credible fear
of return.”205 These apparent shortcomings affect the ability of
the United States to sufficiently satisfy international standards
by, specifically, avoiding arbitrariness through individualized
assessments and judicial review.206
198. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 20.
199. Id. at 20-21, 41.
200. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 81.
201. See Part I.C., supra.
202. See UDHR, supra note 66, at art. 14(1) (III); Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; ICCPR, supra
note 66, at art. 9(1). See also Part I.C., supra.
203. Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra note 170; UNLOCKING
LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
204. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21 (“While the list [of special
vulnerability factors to be included in the tool] falls short of the recommendation from experts to ICE, the creation of a tool can be followed by improvement of it.”).
205. Id. at 41.
206. See supra, Part B.1.
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By ignoring the recommendations of LIRS and other asylum
experts involved in the development of the tool, ICE squandered a valuable opportunity to comply with international
law.207 Subsequent to viewing ICE’s new tool, LIRS published
their recommendations to ICE regarding a risk assessment
tool.208 It envisions a dynamic individualized assessment procedure that encourages release, or, if some form of detention is
necessary, the least restrictive ATD or detention procedure
necessary to mitigate the risks presented by the individual alien.209 It also allows for review of a determination should there
be a change in circumstances or risk factors for an asylumseeker.210 Had ICE adopted a risk-assessment tool in line with
these recommendations, it would allow for a greater chance of
eliminating arbitrary, unnecessary detention.211 Instead, ICE
has selected a suboptimal path that has the potential to “lockin” continuing violations of international human rights law for
future iterations of the tool.212
B. ICE Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal ATDs
In 2004, Congress approved funding for ATD programs and
ICE solicited bids for the contract to manage them.213 Various
NGOs—including the Vera Institute—bid for the contract, basing their qualifications on their expertise in refugee, asylee,
and immigration services.214 In a further example of the United
States selecting to move down a suboptimal path, ICE “gave
the contract to Behavioral Interventions Inc., a private company whose model was based on the use of electronic monitoring.”215 Behavioral Interventions Inc. (“BI”) and its parent company still hold the U.S. ATD contract.216

207. See UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21 (stating issues with ICE’s
risk analysis tool “will severely limit its capacity to advance the efficiency of
custody and removal operations as a whole”).
208. Id. at appendices B, C, D, 54–61.
209. Id. at appendix B, 54–55.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 20–22.
212. See David, supra note 23, at 335–36; Wilsford, supra note 178; Part III,
supra.
213. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 29.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Commonly used in the criminal judicial system, home curfew
and electronic tagging are the most restrictive ATDs, and, as
noted above, are considered by some to be an additional form of
detention.217 BI currently uses ICE’s congressional ATD funding to combine those most restrictive methods with reporting
requirements—“installation of biometric voice recognition software, unannounced home visits, employer verification, and inperson reporting to supervise participants”218—to administer a
single program: the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (“ISAP II”).219 While for the first time in 2009 ICE included the presence of a “needs-based case management component” as a requirement for a company to obtain the ATD contract, this appears to be an as yet unfulfilled commitment.220 In
looking at the restrictive nature of these methods, scholars
have noted, “sometimes what is called an alternative to detention may in fact be an alternative form of detention.”221
This is especially true when considering that “rather than
looking to the current detention populations and utilizing various supervision methods as a step down from unnecessary detention, [ISAP II] is seeking individuals already released into
the community to increase restrictions of liberty on more people.”222 The use of ISAP II in these scenarios remains arbitrary
and subject to the discretion of the ICE officer analyzing the
parole eligibility of an asylum-seeker.223 For example, while
“[a]liens should be assigned conditions of supervision according
to an assessment of the alien’s flight risk and danger to the
community[, in ISAP II] assignment to a[n ATD] program is
determined in part by residency,” as only those asylum-seekers
detained in close proximity to a regional ISAP II office are eli-

217. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 53–54; Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 36–38; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38.
218. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 31.
219. Id. at 31–32.
220. See id. at 31.
221. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 4 (emphasis in original).
222. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 32. This theory is additionally
supported by statements of ICE officials to Congress in explaining their 2012
budget requests: “[T]he ICE Assistant Secretary noted that the cost of ATD
per individual is higher than detention per detainee . . . because the individuals enrolled in ATD remain in the system significantly longer than those in
detention.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-91, at 53 (2011).
223. See Part I.B. & Part I.C., supra.

2012]

OVER-DETENTION

485

gible to participate.224 “ICE has not requested-and Congress
has yet to authorize-sufficient funding to expand ATD programs nationally-so that any immigration detainee who is eligible for an ATD program could be placed into it.”225
Furthermore, ICE’s plan for ISAP II “would not use ATDs as
an alternative that would decrease the use of existing detention
beds…[t]he total number of individuals in ICE custody or supervision, whether detained on Alternatives to Detention,
would increase under this plan.”226 Thus, the United States
continues to unnecessarily detain parole-eligible asylumseekers by placing them into ISAP II.227 “ICE’s plan also explicitly precludes the use of ATDs for individuals who are technically subject to ‘mandatory detention.’”228
V. POLICY BENEFITS TO UNITED STATES SHOULD IT ADOPT THE
RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to the benefit of being in compliance with international human rights laws, there are numerous advantages for
the United States should it adopt the proposed programs.229
First, the country can maintain its status as a leader in the international community in good faith, and a stance of internal
compliance will better position the country to encourage other
nations to follow suit.230 Next, much of U.S. foreign policy in
the war on terror depends on how the country is perceived in
the international community and among individual populations.231 Because many people will still be deported, how they
feel about the process and what they say to others upon return
to their countries may have an impact on public image in areas
where the United States desperately needs support.232 A reputation of humanitarian treatment and fair dealings could go a
long way.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 20.
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 35, at 27.
Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).
UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 39.
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 35, at 28.
E.g., Brané, supra note 31, at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, there is an enormous potential for financial savings.233 Currently, it costs $95 per day to detain an asylumseeker, but only $22 per day to support that same person in an
alternative program.234 Some estimate that the disparity could
be even more extreme, with ICE overhead costs bringing detention costs up to $164 per detainee per day while some forms of
ATDs cost as little as thirty cents per day.235 While the numbers include more than just asylum-seekers, the savings associated with detaining only those who present a true risk, such
as only detaining those who have “committed violent crimes,
the agency could save nearly $4.4 million a night, or $1.6 billion annually—an 82% reduction in costs.”236
CONCLUSION
When coupled with an efficient and individualized risk analysis program, Alternatives to Detention adequately address the
risks of releasing the majority of asylum-seekers into the community during the pendency of their asylum processing.237 Instituting this combination would benefit the United States financially and in its international standing in addition to allowing the United States to comply with its international human
rights obligations regarding the detention of asylum-seekers.238
The United States should move quickly to adopt the recommendations of asylum experts, capitalizing on the current momentum for reform in the detention system and decisively ending its violations of international human rights laws.
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